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Abstract
In the “Anfal trial,” the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) in Baghdad convicted five former Iraqi
high officials of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 1988 against the
Iraqi Kurds. The evidence presented at trial—which included both voluminous documentary evi-
dence as well as eye-witness testimony—demonstrated the clear existence of a genocidal campaign
by the former Iraqi government and military, which eliminated an estimated 182,000 Iraqi Kurds
in 1988, including through the use of chemical weapons (the eight-phased “Anfal campaign”). Ali
Hassan al-Majid al-Tikriti (“Majid”), known by the moniker “Chemical Ali,” and four others were
convicted—three of whom (including Majid) were sentenced to death. Saddam Hussein al-Majid
al-Tikriti (“Saddam Hussein”) was dropped from the proceedings after his execution following the
verdict in the Dujail trial. In the Anfal Trial Chamber judgment, the judges explained fairly per-
suasively how genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed against the Iraqi
Kurds. The primary weaknesses of the Trial Chamber judgment include: (i) a less persuasive job
in examining individual criminal responsibility; and (ii) a failure to address fair trial problems that
arose during the trial, such as insufficiently detailed charges. On appeal, the Cassation Chamber
judges did not seriously grapple with the merits of the case. This article evaluates the successes
and failures of this trial and judgments.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WHY THE  KILLING IN DARFUR 
IS GENOCIDE 
By Jennifer Trahan* 
INTRODUCTION 
The world has shamelessly stood by as the atrocities  commit- 
ted  in Darfur,  Sudan  have occurred over the  last several years. 
While 200,000-400,0001 have been killed and an estimated 2.5 
million displaced,2 all based on tribal ethnicity,  pledges of “never 
again”  made  both after  the  Holocaust and  the  Rwandan  geno- 
cide, have once again rung  hollow.  It should  not matter whether 
 
*  Ms. Trahan has  served  as both  Counsel  and  Of  Counsel  to  the  International 
Justice Program of Human Rights Watch, as Iraq Prosecutions Consultant for the Inter- 
national Center for  Transitional Justice,  and  as a Defense  Consultant to  the  Special 
Court  of Sierra Leone  (Freetown, Sierra Leone). She has been  a Visiting Lecturer with 
Columbia University’s Masters in Human Rights Program, and  an Adjunct  Professor  at 
New York University’s Masters in Global Affairs Program, Fordham Law School,  Brook- 
lyn Law School  and  The  New School.   She  is the  author of HUMAN  RIGHTS   WATCH, 
GENOCIDE, WAR  CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST  HUMANITY:  A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE 
LAW   OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR  THE  FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA   (2006). 
Brandi  Christie,  Amber  Lewis, Lindsay Menard-Freeman, Natalie  Prokop, Seema Shah, 
Julie Ann Simeone and Joel Suarez provided research assistance for this article.  Olivier 
Bercault  and  Sudan  scholar  Eric Reeves provided valuable  additional assistance.   The 
views expressed herein are  those  of the  author. 
1.  A survey by the  Coalition  for International Justice puts  the  fatality figures  near 
400,000 from  February  2003 to April 2005. See Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Dar- 
fur, SUDAN  TRIB.,  Sept.  17, 2006.  Other studies  have used  figures  of 170,000-255,000, 
220,000-270,000,  and  even 500,000.  See id.; see also Current Situation in Darfur: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th  Cong.  53 (2007)  (statement of Hon.  Tom 
Lantos,  Chairman, Comm.  on  Foreign  Affairs) (using  a figure  of “as many as 400,000 
people . . . .”); Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Darfur (Part I), SUDANREEVES.ORG, 
Apr.  28,  2006,  http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article/02.html (putting  figure  at  over 
450,000). 
2.  See, e.g., Warren  Hoge,  U.N. Secretary General To Meet Sudanese Leader, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2007 (“An estimated 2.5 million  people have been  forced  from  their  land  in 
Darfur  . . . .”).  Human Rights Watch currently appears to be using the  figure  2.4 mil- 
lion displaced. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH [HRW],  DARFUR 2007:  CHAOS BY DESIGN- 
PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES FOR  AMIS AND  UNAMID 5 (2007),  available at http:// 
hrw.org/reports/2007/sudan0907/sudan0907web.pdf [hereinafter CHAOS  BY  DESIGN]. 
As of October 2007, the  Office of the  United Nations  (“U.N.”)  Deputy  Special Repre- 
sentative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Sudan  U.N. Resident  and Humanitarian Co- 
ordinator put  the  figure  at  2,387,000  displaced, with  4.2  million  “conflict-affected.” 
U.N. Deputy  Special Representative of the  U.N. Secretary-General for Sudan  Resident 
and  Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Darfur Humanitarian  Profile No. 29, at 3, Oct. 1, 2004, 
available at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/HNP%2029_narrative_1%20October%20 
2007.pdf. 
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the  killing  in  Darfur  is characterized as “genocide,”  mass mur- 
der, extermination or ethnic  cleansing for the world commu- 
nity—and  particularly, the  United Nations  Security Council—to 
have acted  forcefully  before  now.3    It matters  little  to those  on 
the  ground what legal nomenclature is used  to characterize the 
crimes  by which they were killed.   Yet, sometimes  semantics  do 
appear to matter, particularly in terms  of garnering media  and 
public  attention on the crowded  world stage.4   While various 
countries and  institutions have characterized the  killing  as “ge- 
nocide”—including   the    United   States    Government5      and 
 
 
 
3.  The U.N. can utilize both  non-forceful and forceful  intervention under Chapter 
VII of the  U.N. Charter when  a situation requires it to  “maintain or  restore  interna- 
tional  peace  and  security.” U.N. Charter art. 39; see id. art. 41 (regarding measures  not 
involving the  use of armed  force);  see also id. art. 42 (regarding the  use of force).   Be- 
cause  the  killing  has  now  spilled  over  into  Chad  and  the  Central  African  Republic, 
there is no  doubt that  Chapter VII could  be  utilized,  and  could  have  been  utilized 
before  now. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006) (determin- 
ing that  the  situation in Sudan  “continues to constitute a threat to international peace 
and  security in the  region  . . .”).  It is widely viewed that  it is the  threat of China’s  veto 
vote that  has prevented forceful  Security Council  action.   China  imports  between  four 
percent and  seven percent of its oil from  Sudan  and  the  Sudan  oil project  is its most 
successful international oil development endeavor. See HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, Q & A: 
CRISIS IN  DARFUR 5 (2007),  available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/dar- 
fur8536_txt.htm. Security Council  action  could have long before  now taken  a variety of 
forms, such as protecting refugees  in camps, deploying peacekeepers into Chad and the 
Central  African Republic,  and even deploying peacekeepers into Darfur  to prevent  fur- 
ther  killings.  The consent of Sudan  would not have been  required for a forceful  Chap- 
ter  VII deployment. 
4.  As a legal matter, while early decisions  of the  International Criminal  Tribunal 
for the  Former  Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) suggested  there was a “hierarchy”  of crimes,  with 
genocide being  the  worst crime,  that  approach was subsequently abandoned. See  Wil- 
liam  A. Schabas,  Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity,  and Darfur:  The Commission of In- 
quiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 1717 (2006).   However, there still 
remains  a popular perception of genocide as “the crime  of crimes.” See id. at 1716; see 
also David Luban,  Calling Genocide By Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN 
Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L  L. 303, 306 (2006)  (“To everyone in the world other than  a hand- 
ful of international lawyers, genocide is the  ‘crime  of crimes,’  regardless of what the 
judges  on  the  Appellate  Chambers in The  Hague  say.”). 
5.  Colin Powell stated  before  the Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee that  “geno- 
cide has been  committed in Darfur.”  The Crisis in Darfur: Testimony Before the Senate  For- 
eign Relations Committee (statement of Secretary  of State  Colin  Powell)  (Sept.  9, 2004), 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm.  Pow- 
ell’s conclusions were based on interviews with 1136 randomly chosen  refugees  in Chad 
in July and  August 2004, with the  findings  published in a report on  the  State Depart- 
ment’s  website. See  BUREAU  OF  DEMOCRACY, HUMAN  RIGHTS, AND  LABOR & BUREAU  OF 
INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T  OF STATE, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES  IN DARFUR 2, 
4 (2004)  [hereinafter DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES]. 
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others6—various other  key  international  actors,   such   as  the 
United Nations7  (“U.N.”)  and  certain  international non-govern- 
mental  organizations (“NGOs”)8 have not done  so.  In fact, there 
is good  reason  to conclude that  the  killing is genocide. 
This  Article  details  the  legal requirements of the  crime  of 
genocide, with specific emphasis  on  the  dolus specialis —the  spe- 
cial intent requirement of genocide.9   The  Article also compiles 
factual information as to the crimes that have occurred in Darfur 
and demonstrates how each of the legal requirements regarding 
genocide has  been   met.   Part  I  provides  background on  the 
crimes  that  have occurred.  Part  II examines the  legal require- 
 
 
6.  Others who have described the  situation as genocide include the  Parliament of 
the  European Union, the  Defense  Minister  of the  Government of Germany,  General 
Romeo  Dallaire  of Canada  (U.N.  peacekeeping force  commander in Rwanda),  and  a 
great  many  international genocide scholars.   See Eric Reeves, Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: A Critical Analysis (Part II), IDEA,  Oct. 14, 2005, http:// 
www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=39. Additional  groups  that have declared the cri- 
sis in Darfur  to be genocide include:  Physicians for Human Rights, U.S. Committee for 
Refugees,  Africa Action, Justice Action (U.K.),  Yad Vashem, Genocide Watch, and  The 
Campaign to Prevent  Genocide.  Interview  with Eric Reeves (Jan.  5, 2008). 
7.  The  U.N.’s International  Commission of Inquiry  on  Darfur  was established by 
Security Council  Resolution 1564, and published its findings  after a three-month inves- 
tigation  into  crimes  in  Darfur.  See  S.C. Res. 1564,  U.N.  Doc.  S/RES/1564 (Sept.  18, 
2004).   The  Commission deemed that  some of the  violations committed by Sudan  and 
the  Janjaweed  were “very likely to amount to war crimes” and  “crimes against  human- 
ity.” See  U.N.  Int’l  Comm’n  of Inquiry  on  Darfur  [ICID],  Report to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, ¶ 630, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 
(Jan.  25, 2005),  available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf 
[hereinafter Commission of Inquiry].  It suggested  that  “in some  instances,  individuals, 
including Government officials” may have committed “acts with genocidal intent,”  al- 
though it concluded that  “the crucial  element of genocidal intent appears to be miss- 
ing, at least as far as the central  Government authorities are concerned.” Id. ¶¶ 640-41. 
Several articles have since been  published discussing  potential legal errors  in the Com- 
mission’s conclusions. See, e.g., Luban,  supra note  4, at 306; Jamie A. Mathew, The Darfur 
Debate:  Whether the ICC Should Determine That the Atrocities In Darfur Constitute Genocide, 18 
FLA.  J. INT’L  L. 517 (2006);  Beth  Van Schaack,  Darfur And The Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 
WHITTIER  L. REV. 1101 (2005);  Eric Reeves, Report of the International Commission of In- 
quiry on Darfur:  A Critical Analysis (Part I), IDEA,  Oct.  14,  2005,  http:// 
www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=38.  Additional  errors  are suggested  in Part II.E. 
of this Article. 
8.  Human Rights Watch,  for example, has termed the  killing  “ethnic  cleansing,” 
but  not   “genocide.”   See, e.g.,  HUMAN  RIGHTS   WATCH,  DARFUR   DESTROYED:   ETHNIC 
CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT  AND MILITIA FORCES IN  WESTERN SUDAN  39 (2004),  available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/ [hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED]. 
9.  See Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 45 
(July 5, 2001)  (“This  intent [required for the  crime  of genocide] has been  referred to 
as, for example, special intent, specific intent, dolus specialis, particular intent and geno- 
cidal intent.”). 
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ments  of the  crime  of genocide—the four  part  “dolus specialis” 
and  the  underlying crimes.   Specifically, Part  II.A examines the 
requirement that there be “intent  to destroy.”  Part II.B discusses 
the  requirement that  there be  intent to  destroy  a  group  “in 
whole or in part.”   Part  II.C discusses the  requirement that  the 
intent to destroy must target  “a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.”   Part  II.D discusses  the  requirement that  the  
intent to destroy must target  a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group “as such.”  Each of these subparts  also includes  
factual information showing  how  the  crimes  that  have  
occurred in  Darfur  satisfy these  legal requirements.10    Part  II.E 
examines two contrary  arguments that  have  sometimes  been  
invoked  to  suggest  the  absence  of genocidal intent.  Finally, 
Part  II.F examines the  elements  of three underlying crimes—
killing, intentional infliction of  serious  bodily  or  mental   harm,   
and  intentionally inflicting upon the group conditions 
calculated to bring about  destruction of the  group in whole or  
in part—and shows, based  on  factual information  from   Darfur,   
that   those   crimes   have  occurred. While the information 
discussed in this Article is not evidence— that  will have to be, 
and  presumably has been,  gathered by the International 
Criminal  Court  (“ICC”), which is investigating the crimes,11  or 
by other courts—the facts compiled suggest that  genocide  has 
occurred. The Article finishes with a brief discussion in Part III 
of the challenges facing the ICC in its Darfur  prosecutions. 
The  Article  ultimately  concludes that  international  actors 
should  not  hesitate  to call the  crime  genocide,12  and  the  ICC— 
 
10.  This information has been  compiled largely from the following Human Rights 
Watch reports: DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8; HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, ENTRENCHING 
IMPUNITY:   GOVERNMENT  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  CRIMES IN  DARFUR (2005), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/ [hereinafter ENTRENCHING 
IMPUNITY]; HUMAN  RIGHTS  WATCH, DARFUR  DOCUMENTS  CONFIRM GOVERNMENT POLICY 
OF  MILITIA  SUPPORT   (2004),  available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/ 
19/darfur9096.htm [hereinafter DARFUR  DOCUMENTS]. 
11.  The  situation in  Darfur   was referred to  the  International Criminal   Court 
(“ICC”) by the U.N. Security Council.  See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 
31, 2005). 
12.  At least one  noted genocide scholar  suggests the  hesitation to call the  crimes 
“genocide”  stems  from  a fallacious  notion that  if the  crimes  were deemed genocide, 
there would be an obligation of humanitarian intervention; that scholar,  however, notes 
that  the more  logical reading of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide is that  it does not require such intervention. See Convention on 
the  Prevention and  Punishment of the  Crime  of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Schabas, supra note  4, at 1718; see also Luban, 
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\31-4\FIN407.txt unknown Seq: 5 12-MAY-08 16:38  
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which,  to  date,  has  issued  warrants  for  war crimes  and  crimes 
against  humanity against  two individuals  regarding crimes  com- 
mitted  in Darfur13—should consider charging the crime of ge- 
nocide. Of course,  none of these legal arguments should  matter 
because  the  international  community should   have  acted  long 
before  now, and  what the  killing  is called  should  be irrelevant. 
The  killing  should  have been  brought to  a halt  by an  interna- 
tional  force  deployed by the  U.N.  Now that  the  goals of the  ge- 
nocide  have largely been  accomplished, the challenge for the 
international  community  is  to   ensure  that   the   violence   is 
brought to  an  immediate halt,  those   on  the  ground  receive 
needed protection, the  violence  does  not  extend further into 
Chad14 and the Central  African Republic,15 there is a negotiated 
political  settlement as to  the  future of Darfur,  and  justice  for 
these  crimes  occurs—both through robust  support of the  ICC 
and additional justice mechanisms. Yet, if there was any doubt as 
to what crime has been  occurring, those doubts  should  be extin- 
guished.16 
 
 
supra note  4, at 306 (“the  [Genocide Convention] imposes no legal obligation to act”). 
Others have speculated that the U.N.’s commission of experts  may have been  motivated 
by “crude  anti-Americanism” in  not  deeming the  situation genocide, given  that  the 
United States had  been  vocal in calling  it genocide. See generally  Reeves, supra note  6. 
13.  The  warrants  are for Ahmad  Muhammad Harun, former  Minister  of State for 
the  Interior and  current Minister  of State  for Humanitarian Affairs, and  Ali Muham- 
mad  Ali Abd Al Rahman, known  as Ali Kushayb,  a Janjaweed  militia  leader.  See  U.N. 
Security Council,  Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR1593, ¶ 2 (Dec.  5, 2007)  [hereinafter Sixth Report]. 
14.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, THEY CAME HERE TO  KILL  US:  MILITIA ATTACKS 
AND  ETHNIC   TARGETING  OF   CIVILIANS IN   EASTERN  CHAD  (2007),   available at  http:// 
www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/(documenting a drastic deterioration in the 
human rights situation in eastern Chad,  where  more  than  300 civilians were killed and 
at least 17,000 people displaced in militia violence in November 2006); see also Compre- 
hensive Peace in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(10),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)  (referring to “Gov- 
ernment of Sudan  . . . aerial  attack  missions and  deadly  raids  across the  international 
border between  Sudan  and  Chad  . . . .”). 
15.  See  Press  Release,  Human Rights  Watch,  Security  Council’s  Troop   Plan  in 
Chad/CAR Risks Failing Many:  Forces Should  Protect  All Civilians in Danger  (Sept. 27, 
2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/27/chad/6965.htm (“Security  Council 
resolution 1778  focuses  assistance  on  areas  of  eastern Chad  and  northeastern CAR 
where  continued armed  conflict,  general lawlessness, and  chronic instability–-partly  re- 
lated to the conflict in the adjoining Darfur  region  of Sudan–-have  exacerbated the 
humanitarian  crisis.”). 
16.  This Article does not attempt to show precisely who among  the perpetrators of 
the  genocide bears  individual  and/or command responsibility within the  Janjaweed  or 
Government of Sudan,  although it does  illustrate  the  close coordination between  the 
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\31-4\FIN407.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-MAY-08 16:38  
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The  crimes  in  Darfur  commenced in  the  Spring  of 2003, 
when Sudanese government forces and  a militia force  known  as 
the  “Janjaweed”17   attacked   primarily  three African  tribes—the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa18—in the rural  areas of Darfur,  a large 
area  in Western  Sudan.   The  attack  was a response to the  insur- 
gency that  had  been  led by two Darfurian rebel  movements, the 
Sudan  Liberation Army/Movement (“SLA/SLAM”)  and  the  Jus- 
tice and Equality Movement (“JEM”).19  The Janjaweed are pri- 
marily  “camel-herding nomads  who  migrated to  Darfur   from 
Chad  and  West Africa in the  1970s, and  from  Arab camel-herd- 
ing tribes  from  North Darfur.”20 
The  conflict  has  its  roots  in  inter-communal conflict  be- 
tween these nomadic camel and cattle-herders, and sedentary 
farmers,  competing for  land  and  water  resources.21    “Until  the 
1970s, these tensions  were kept under control by traditional con- 
flict resolution mechanisms.”22   These  tensions  escalated  in  re- 
cent  decades  due  to extended periods  of drought, competition 
for scarce resources, a lack of good  governance, and  the  availa- 
bility of weapons.23   A 1994 reorganization by the Sudanese Gov- 
ernment of President Omar  El Bashir gave Arab groups  new po- 
sitions of power  in Darfur,  which the  Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa 
saw  as  an  attempt  to  undermine  their   leadership  roles  and 
 
 
Janjaweed  and  Sudanese armed  forces  in  perpetrating crimes.  See  infra Part  II.A.2.b, 
II.A.2.d. 
17.  “The term  ‘Janjaweed’ . . . is reported to be an amalgamation of three Arabic 
words for ghost,  gun,  and  horse  that  historically  referred to criminals,  bandits  or out- 
laws.” DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 2 n.3. 
18.  Other communities impacted include the  Dajo, Tunjur, Meidob,  Jebel, Berti, 
and  other non-Arab  tribes.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 7.  It is quite 
possible  that  these  groups,  also targeted on  an ethnic  basis, are  part  of the  genocide. 
Interview  with Eric Reeves, supra note  6. 
19.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 6.  The  army and  Janjaweed’s re- 
sponse,  however,  could  in no  way be characterized as simply targeting the  insurgents. 
In many cases, there was “little or no” rebel  presence when villages were targeted, and, 
even  if rebels  were present, there was no  attempt to distinguish between  combatants 
and non-combatants in villages under attack. See id. at 7.  The Sudan  Liberation Army/ 
Movement (“SLA/M”) and  the  Justice  and  Equality  Movement (“JEM”) rebel  groups 
also appear to have committed serious  abuses.  See id. 
20.  DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 2.  There are also cattle herding Arabs in 
the  Janjaweed.   Interview  with Eric Reeves, supra note  6. 
21.  See DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 2 n.4. 
22.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 6. 
23.  See id. 
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power.24   Hostilities  broke  out in West Darfur  in 1998 and  1999, 
resulting in  hundreds killed.25   The  current outbreak of large- 
scale crimes  was prompted by an SLA attack  on  Fasher  in April 
2003.26 
After the  attack  on  Fasher,  the  government and  Janjaweed 
commenced  a  full-scale  attack   upon  the   Fur,   Masalit   and 
Zaghawa that consisted  of a combination of aerial bombardment 
by Government of Sudan  armed  forces, with the Janjaweed  mov- 
ing  in  on  horseback.27    The  crimes,  detailed below, have  been 
described as “scorched-earth tactics”28 that  leave almost  nothing 
remaining of the  villages attacked.  This Article concentrates on 
crimes  committed in 2003 and  2004, which  represent arguably 
the  high  point  of the  killing  in  Darfur,29  and  are  the  years at 
issue in the  ICC’s warrants.30   Although the  killing in Darfur  ap- 
pears  to be  in decline, individuals  in camps  continue to be  at- 
tacked,31 and other killing continues as well.32   The violence  has 
now  spilled  beyond  the  borders of Darfur  into  Chad  and  the 
 
 
24.  See  id.   The  1994  reorganization created the  three Darfur  states  of  North, 
South and West Darfur.   The effect of the reorganization was to negate  in particular the 
political  power  of  the  Fur,  the  largest  ethnic   group in  Darfur.   Interview  with  Eric 
Reeves, supra note  6. 
25.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 6-7. 
26.  See id. at 7. 
27.  See id. 
28.  See id.; Comprehensive Peace  in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(7),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(2006). 
29.  See, e.g., ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 8 (“The  pervasive pattern of 
government-militia coordinated attacks on villages [in  Darfur] has declined in 2005 in 
comparison with previous years, but this is largely because  most of the targeted popula- 
tion  has already  been  displaced from  the  most fertile,  desirable rural  areas.”). 
30.  The  International Criminal  Court  was referred the  situation of Darfur  by the 
U.N. Security Council.  See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar.  31, 2005).   To 
date,  as a result  of the  International Criminal  Court’s  investigation, two warrants  have 
been  issued.  See supra note  13 and  accompanying text. 
31.  See, e.g., HUMAN  RIGHTS   WATCH, SEXUAL   VIOLENCE   AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES 
AMONG  DISPLACED PERSONS  IN  DARFUR AND  CHAD 3-9 (2005),  available at http://www. 
hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505/  (documenting how  Sudanese  security 
forces, deployed to protect displaced persons,  and  Janjaweed  continue to commit  rape 
and  sexual  violence  against  women  and  girls in  camps  in  Chad  and  Darfur); see  also 
CHAOS BY  DESIGN, supra note  2, at 17. 
32.  See,  e.g., Hoge,  supra note  2 (reporting on  U.N.  Secretary  General Ban  Ki- 
moon’s  concern about  the  deaths  of hundreds of people in the  [summer of 2007]  in 
Darfur); Press Release,  Human Rights Watch, New Clashes Jeopardize Civilians:  Esca- 
lating Violence Highlights Need for Civilian Protection (Oct.  10, 2007), http://hrw. 
org/english/docs/2007/10/10/darfur/7063.htm; Lydia Polgreen, Scorched-Earth Strat- 
egy Returns To Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, March  2, 2008, at A1 and  A16. 
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Central   African  Republic.33     African  Union   (“AU”)  forces,  as 
part of an AU observer mission (“AMIS”), were deployed starting 
in July 2004,34  and  a U.N./AU hybrid  force  has been  scheduled 
for a January  1, 2008 deployment.35 
 
 
II.  THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 
 
The  definition of “genocide”36  has remained essentially un- 
changed since the 1948 Genocide Convention.37   It requires a 
showing  of the  dolus specialis —the  “special intent”  requirement 
of genocide—consisting  of: 
(1)  intent to destroy 
(2)  in whole or in part 
(3)  a national, ethnical, racial  or religious  group 
(4)  as such.38 
 
 
33.  See supra notes  14-15 and  accompanying text. 
34.  The  African  Union  Observer  Mission started  in  July 2004 as a small military 
observer  presence to monitor the  April 2004 humanitarian ceasefire  agreement; as of 
October 2005, it had  increased to approximately 7000 personnel. See ENTRENCHING IM- 
PUNITY, supra note  10, at 7. 
35.  The  Security Council  has authorized a January  1, 2008 deployment of 26,000 
peacekeepers (UNMID) to  replace   the  7000  African  Union   peacekeepers that  have 
been  in Sudan.  Editorial,  Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22. 
The government of Sudan  has been  actively obstructing deployment of the force.  Press 
Release, Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Security Council  Should  End Sudan’s Obstruction 
(Dec.  19, 2007),  http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/18/darfur/7589.htm. 
36.  Raphael  Lemkin  coined  the  word  “genocide”  in  1944.   The  word  is derived 
“from the Greek word genos, meaning ‘race’ or ‘tribe’ and the Latin word cide, meaning 
‘killing.’ ” Toby Jack, Sudan’s Genocide:  Punishment Before Prevention,  24 PENN  ST. INT’L  L. 
REV. 707, 708 (2006)  (citing  RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS  RULE IN OCCUPIED  EUROPE  (1944)). 
37.  See  Genocide Convention, supra note  12, art.  2.  The  Government of Sudan 
acceded to the Genocide Convention on October 12, 2003. Office of the U.N. Comm’r 
for Human Rights, Status of Ratification  of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun- 
ishment of  the  Crime  of  Genocide, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratifica- 
tion/1.htm (last  visited Apr. 29, 2008).   The  Convention includes  an obligation to ex- 
tradite or prosecute perpetrators of genocide. See Genocide Convention, supra note  12, 
art. 1 (“The  Contracting Parties  confirm  that  genocide, whether committed in time  of 
peace  or  in  time  of war, is a crime  under international law which  they  undertake to 
prevent  and to punish.”). Crimes committed in Sudan  prior  to October 12, 2003 could 
also constitute genocide because  genocide is accepted as customary  international law 
and  as a jus cogens norm  from  which  no  derogations are  permitted. See  William  W. 
Bishop, Jr., Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion, 45 AM. J. INT’L  L. 579, 584 (1951)  (“[T]he principles underlying the  [Geno- 
cide]  Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations  as binding on 
States, even without  any conventional obligation.”). 
38.  See generally  JENNIFER  TRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR  CRIMES 
AND  CRIMES AGAINST  HUMANITY:  A TOPICAL DIGEST OF  THE  CASE   LAW   OF THE INTERNA- 
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Additionally,  proof  of  one  or  more  underlying crimes  or  acts 
(the  “underlying crimes”)  is required.39   They are: 
(a)  Killing members of the  group; 
(b)   Causing  serious  bodily  or  mental  harm  to  members  of 
the  group; 
(c)  Deliberately  inflicting  on the group conditions of life cal- 
culated  to bring about  its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
(d)   Imposing measures  intended to prevent  births  within the 
group; 
(e)  Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.40 
These  same requirements are today found in the  Statutes  of the 
International Criminal  Tribunal for the Former  Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”),41  the International Criminal  Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”),42  the  ICC,43  and  the  Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts  of Cambodia.44    “It is widely recognised that  the  law set 
out  in the  [Genocide] Convention reflect[s] customary  interna- 
tional  law and  that  the  norm  prohibiting genocide constitutes 
jus cogens.”45    The United States criminalizes  genocide by federal 
statute.46 
Additionally,  to  prosecute an  individual  for  genocide, one 
 
 
TIONAL  CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR  THE  FORMER   YUGOSLAVIA   144-68 (2006)   [hereinafter 
ICTY DIGEST]. 
39.  See  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´,  Case No.  IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 640 (Jan.  17, 
2005)  (“[T]he Statute  characterises genocide by the  following  constitutive elements: 
(1)  one or several of the underlying acts of the offence  . . . ; and (2)  the specific intent 
of the  crime  of genocide, which  is described as the  intent to destroy,  in whole  or  in 
part,  a national, ethnical, racial  or  religious  group, as such.”);  see  also Prosecutor v. 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 681 (Sept.  1, 2004);  Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, 
Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Dec.  14, 1999). 
40.  See Rome Statute  of the International Criminal  Court  art. 6, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
41.  See  Statute  of the  International Criminal  Tribunal for the  Former  Yugoslavia 
art. 4, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
42.  See Security Council  Statute  of the International Criminal  Tribunal for Rwanda 
art. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
43.  See Rome  Statute  of the  International Criminal  Court,  supra note  40, art. 6. 
44.  See Law on the  Establishment of the  Extraordinary Chambers in the  Courts  of 
Cambodia for the  Prosecution of Crimes Committed During  the  Period  of Democratic 
Kampuchea art. 4 (2001)  (Cambodia), amended  by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct.  27, 2004). 
45.  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´, Case No. IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 639 (Jan. 17, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 680 (Sept.  1, 2004); Prosecu- 
tor  v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 500 (July 31, 2003). 
46.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006). 
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would require a form  of individual  responsibility—such as com- 
mitting,  instigating, ordering, planning, aiding  and  abetting, or 
joint participation—or command responsibility.47  While these 
forms of responsibility are key to proving  the guilt or innocence 
of a particular individual, this  Article  does  not  address  the  re- 
sponsibility  of particular individuals. 
 
A. The Requirement of “Intent To Destroy” 
 
1.  The  Legal Criteria 
 
As to the  first legal requirement of the  dolus specialis— -“in- 
tent  to destroy”—case  law from  the  ICTY shows that: 
(1)  there must be a goal of destroying  a group as a separate 
and  distinct  entity;48 
(2)  even if destruction was not  the  original  goal,  it may be- 
come  the  goal;49 
(3)  there must be an intentional attack  against  a group, and 
the  intention to participate in or carry out  the  attack.50 
Knowledge  that  the  underlying crime  would inevitably or likely 
result  in  destruction is  insufficient—destruction must  be  the 
aim.51   Because specific intent to destroy is key, it is not necessary 
to prove actual destruction of the group or groups  in whole or in 
 
47.  See  Rome  Statute  of the  International Criminal  Court,  supra note  40, art.  25 
(describing individual  responsibility); id. art. 28 (describing command responsibility). 
Joint  Participation has  sometimes  been  articulated as “joint  criminal  enterprise,” see 
ICTY DIGEST, supra note  38, at 390-438, and  also the  “common purpose doctrine.” 
48.  See Blagojevic´ ,  Case No.  IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 670 (“[T]he Trial  Chamber 
recalls that  the  specific intent must  be to destroy  the  group as a separate and  distinct 
entity.”);  see also Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 698 (“The  Trial Chamber 
concurs  with the  observation made  by the  Sikirica Trial Chamber that:   ‘[t]he ultimate 
victim of genocide is the  group, although its destruction necessarily  requires the  com- 
mission  of crimes  against  its members, that  is, against  individuals  belonging to  that 
group.’ ”). 
49.  See Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 572 (Aug. 2, 2001) 
(“It is conceivable  that, although the intention at the outset  of an operation was not the 
destruction of a group, it may become the  goal at some  later  point  during the  imple- 
mentation of the  operation.”). 
50.  See Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 78 (Dec.  14, 1999) 
(“[T]he Trial  Chamber will have  to  verify that  there was both  an  intentional attack 
against a group and an intention upon the part of the accused  to participate in or carry 
out  this attack.”). 
51.  See Blagojevic´ ,  Case No. IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 656 (“It is not  sufficient  that 
the  perpetrator simply knew that  the  underlying crime  would inevitably or likely result 
in the destruction of the group. The  destruction, in whole or in part,  must be the aim 
of the  underlying crime(s).”). 
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part,  although actual destruction may constitute evidence  of spe- 
cific intent.52   No lengthy  premeditation is required.53   A policy 
or plan  of “destruction” is not  required, although it may be an 
important factor  in  helping to  establish  that  the  accused  pos- 
sessed the  requisite genocidal intent.54 
 
a.  Seeking  Physical or Biological  Destruction 
 
The  majority  view is that  destruction must  intend or  seek 
the  “physical or biological”  destruction of the  group or groups. 
As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Krstic´: 
The  Genocide Convention, and  customary  international law 
in  general, prohibit only  the  physical  or  biological  destruc- 
tion of a human group. The Trial Chamber expressly ac- 
knowledged this limitation, and eschewed  any broader defini- 
tion.   The  Chamber stated:   “[C]ustomary international law 
limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the 
physical or biological  destruction of all or part  of the  group. 
[A]n  enterprise attacking  only the cultural or sociological 
characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these 
elements which  give to  that  group its own  identity  distinct 
 
52.  See Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (July 31, 2003) 
(“The  key factor is the specific intent to destroy the group rather than  its actual physical 
destruction . . . .  It is the  genocidal dolus specialis that  predominantly constitutes the 
crime.”).   As specified  by the  ICTY: 
In view of the specific intent required for genocide, it is not necessary to prove 
the  de facto destruction of the  group in whole or in part.   Nevertheless, the  de 
facto destruction of the  group may constitute evidence  of the  specific  intent 
and  may also serve to  distinguish the  crime  of genocide from  the  inchoate 
offences  in Article 4(3)  of the  Statute,  such  as the  attempt to commit  geno- 
cide. 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 697. 
53.  See Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 572 (“Article 4 of the Statute  does 
not  require that  the  genocidal acts be premeditated over a long  period.”). 
54.  As stated  in the  Jelisic´ decision: 
[T]he existence  of a plan  or  policy  is not  a legal  ingredient of the  crime. 
However, in the  context of proving  specific intent, the  existence  of a plan  or 
policy may become an important factor  in most cases.  The  evidence  may be 
consistent with the  existence  of a plan  or policy, or may even show such exis- 
tence,  and  the  existence  of a plan  or policy may facilitate  proof  of the  crime. 
Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 5, 2001); see Prosecu- 
tor  v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 225 (Apr.  19, 2004) 
(quoting Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 48); Brd–janin, Case 
No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 705 (quoting Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 48); Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 656 (“The  Appeals Cham- 
ber  has  held  that  the  existence  of a plan  or  policy is not  a legal requirement of the 
crime.”). 
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from the rest of the community would not fall under the defi- 
nition of genocide.”55 
It is not, however, required that the perpetrator choose  the most 
efficient  method of destruction.56    Acts that  do not  cause  death 
are  included in destruction.57 
 
55.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (quoting Krstic´, 
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 694. 
The  contrary  view has also been  expressed, for example, in Blagojevic´ , where  the  Trial 
Chamber stated: 
[T]he Trial Chamber recalls the opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, in the Krstic´ 
Appeals Judgment, according to which a “distinction should  be made  between 
the  nature of the  listed  ‘acts’ [of  genocide] and  the  ‘intent’  with which they 
are  done.”   While  the  listed  acts  indeed must  take  a physical  or  biological 
form,  the same is not required for the intent. With the exceptions of the acts 
listed in Article 4(2)(c) and  (d),  “the Statute  itself does not  require an intent 
to cause  physical or biological  destruction of the  group in whole or in part.” 
Judge  Shahabuddeen found that: 
It is the  group which is protected.  A group is constituted by characteris- 
tics—often  intangible—binding together a collection of people as a social 
unit.   If those  characteristics have been  destroyed in pursuance of the  in- 
tent with which a listed act of a physical or biological nature was done,  it is 
not convincing to say that  the destruction, though effectively obliterating 
the  group, is not  genocide because  the  obliteration was not  physical or 
biological. 
Judge  Shahabuddeen concluded that  “[t]he intent certainly  has to be to de- 
stroy, but,  except  for  the  listed  act,  there is no  reason  why the  destruction 
must  always be physical or biological.” 
Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 659 (quoting Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, 
Partial  Dissenting  Opinion of Judge  Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 45-54). 
56.  The  Appeals Chamber in Krstic´ explained: 
In determining that  genocide occurred at Srebrenica, the cardinal question is 
whether the intent to commit  genocide existed.   While this intent must be 
supported by the  factual  matrix,  the  offence  of genocide does not require proof 
that the perpetrator  chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective  of de- 
stroying  the  targeted part.   Even where  the  method selected  will not  imple- 
ment  the  perpetrator’s intent to  the  fullest,  leaving  that  destruction  incom- 
plete,  this ineffectiveness  alone  does  not  preclude a finding  of genocidal in- 
tent.   The  international attention focused  on  Srebrenica, combined with the 
presence of the  UN troops  in the  area,  prevented those  members of the  VRS 
[Army of Republika Srpska]  Main Staff who devised the  genocidal plan  from 
putting it into action  in the most direct  and efficient  way. Constrained by the 
circumstances, they  adopted the  method which  would  allow them  to  imple- 
ment  the  genocidal design  while minimizing the  risk of retribution. 
Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 32 (emphasis added). 
57.  The  ICTY Trial  Chamber in Blagojevic´ explained: 
A broader notion of the  term  “destroy,” encompassing also “acts which  may 
fall short  of causing  death,”  had already been  considered by the ICTR.  In the 
Akayesu case the  Trial  Chamber found that  acts of rape  and  sexual  violence 
formed an integral part  of the  process  of destruction of the  Tutsi as a group 
and  could  therefore constitute genocide. 
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b.  Forcible  Transfer May Be Part  of the  Destruction 
 
Forcible  transfer may be a basis from  which to infer  intent 
to  destroy.58    According   to  the  ICTY Appeals  Chamber, when 
considering whether the  “Srebrenica massacre”59  in the  former 
Yugoslavia was genocide: 
 
[F]orcible transfer could  be an additional means  by which to 
ensure the  physical destruction of the  Bosnian  Muslim com- 
munity  in Srebrenica.  The  transfer [of  the  women  and  chil- 
dren] completed the  removal  of all Bosnian  Muslims  from 
Srebrenica, thereby  eliminating even  the  residual  possibility 
that  the  Muslim community in the  area  could  reconstitute it- 
self . . . . 
The Trial Chamber—as the best assessor of the evidence 
presented at trial—was entitled to conclude that the evidence 
of the  transfer supported its finding  that  some  members of 
the  VRS [Army of Republika Srpska]  Main Staff intended to 
destroy the Bosnian  Muslims in Srebrenica. The fact that the 
forcible  transfer does not  constitute in and  of itself a genoci- 
dal act does not preclude a Trial Chamber from relying on it 
as evidence  of the  intentions of members of the  VRS Main 
Staff.  The  genocidal intent may be  inferred, among  other 
facts, from  evidence  of “other  culpable acts systematically di- 
rected  against  the  same group.”60 
 
On  the  other hand, there is some  contrary  authority.  One  trial 
chamber rejected forcible  transfer as a basis for inferring intent 
to destroy  where  the  number displaced was far higher than  the 
 
 
Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 662. 
58.  See Krstic´ ,  Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 31 (“[F]orcible 
transfer could  be an additional means  by which to ensure the  physical destruction of 
the  Bosnian  Muslim  community in  Srebrenica.”); id.,  Partial  Dissenting  Opinion  of 
Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶ 35 (“[S]tanding alone, forcible transfer is not genocide. But in 
this case the  transfer did  not  stand  alone  . . . .”). 
59.  In  the  Srebrenica massacre,  7000-8000 Bosnian  Muslim  men  and  boys were 
executed after  the  fall of Srebrenica, a so-called “U.N. safe area,” by Republika Srpska 
forces under the  military control of Ratko Mladic. See generally  HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, 
BALKANS: SREBRENICA’S  MOST WANTED REMAIN FREE (2005),  available at http://www.hrw. 
org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm.  Neither Mladic,  nor  Radovan 
Karadzic—the Republica Srpska  political  leader  at the  time—have  been  arrested, de- 
spite the fact that the ICTY has had arrest  warrants out for them  for many years. See id.; 
Warren  Hoge,  Prosecutor Says Serbia Blocked Arrests in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, 
at A20. 
60.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 31, 33. 
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number killed.61   Another trial chamber rejected deportation as 
showing intent to destroy where the deportation was “not accom- 
panied  by  methods  seeking   the   physical  destruction  of  the 
group.”62 
 
c.  Distinguishing Specific Intent from  Motive 
 
The   law is  clear  that   specific  intent needs   to  be  distin- 
guished  from motive.  The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blasˇ- 
kic´ 63  explained that: 
Mens rea is the  mental  state  or degree of fault  which the  ac- 
cused  held  at the  relevant  time.   Motive is generally  consid- 
ered  as that which causes a person to act.  The Appeals Cham- 
ber  has  held  that,   as  far  as  criminal   responsibility is con- 
cerned,   motive    is   generally    irrelevant   in   international 
criminal  law, but it “becomes  relevant  at the sentencing stage 
in mitigation or aggravation of the  sentence.”64 
 
61.  See  Brd–janin, Case No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 976.  The  Trial  Chamber  re- 
jected  mass deportation as evidence  of special intent to commit  genocide: 
The  extremely  high  number of Bosnian  Muslim and  Bosnian  Croat  men,  wo- 
men   and   children  forcibly  displaced  from   the   [Autonomous  Region   of 
Krajina]  in this case, particularly when  compared to the  number of Bosnian 
Muslims  and   Bosnian   Croats   subjected  to  the   acts  enumerated  in  Arti- 
cle 4(2)(a), (b)  and  (c),  does  not  support the  conclusion that  the  intent to 
destroy the groups  in part,  as opposed to the intent to forcibly displace  them, 
is the  only reasonable inference that  may be drawn  from  the  evidence. 
Id.  
62.  Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 557, aff’d, Prosecutor v. 
Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 46-48 (March  22, 2006). 
As explained by the  Trial  Chamber: 
Had the aim been  to kill all Muslims, the structures were in place for this to be 
accomplished. The Trial Chamber notes that while approximately 23,000 peo- 
ple  were registered as having  passed  through the  Trnopolje camp  at various 
times  when  it was operational and  through other suburban settlements, the 
total  number of  killings  in  Prijedor  municipality probably   did  not  exceed 
3,000. 
Stakic´ , IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 (quoting Stakic´ , IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 553). 
63.  Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment (July 
29, 2004). 
64.  Id. ¶ 694.  The  Appeals Chamber continued: 
As the  Appeals  Chamber held  in the  Jelisic´  and  Kunarac Appeal  Judgements 
and  in the  ICTR Kayishema and  Ruzindana  Appeal  Judgement: 
The  Appeals Chamber further recalls the  necessity to distinguish specific 
intent from motive.  The  personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime 
of genocide may be, for example, to obtain  personal economic benefits, 
or  political  advantage or  some  form  of power.   The  existence  of a per- 
sonal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the spe- 
cific intent to commit  genocide. 
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Thus,  the  Appeals Chamber in Stakic´ explained:  “[T]he Tribu- 
nal’s jurisprudence distinguishes between  motive and  intent; in 
genocide cases, the reason  why the accused  sought  to destroy the 
victim group has no  bearing on  guilt.”65 
 
d.  Intent to Destroy May Be Inferred 
 
The  law permits  intent to be inferred.66   When  “the  prose- 
cution  relies upon proof  of a state of mind  of an accused  by in- 
 
The  Appeals Chamber wishes to assert the important distinction between 
“intent”  and  “motivation.”   The  Appeals Chamber holds  that,  even if the 
perpetrator’s motivation is entirely  sexual, it does not follow that  the per- 
petrator does not  have the  intent to commit  an act of torture or that  his 
conduct does  not  cause  severe  pain  or  suffering,   whether physical  or 
mental, since such pain or suffering  is a likely and logical consequence of 
his conduct. In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether 
a perpetrator intended to  act  in  a way which,  in  the  normal course  of 
events, would cause severe pain  or suffering,  whether physical or mental, 
to his victims. 
The  Appeals Chamber notes  that  criminal  intent (mens rea) must  not  be 
confused with motive  and  that,  in respect  of genocide, personal motive 
does  not   exclude   criminal   responsibility providing  that   the   acts  pro- 
scribed  in Article 2(2)(a) through to (e)  were committed “with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious  group.” 
Id.  (quoting Prosecutor v. Kayishema  & Ruzindana, Case  No.  ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 161 (June  1, 2001).   Similarly, as explained in Jelisic´: 
The  Appeals  Chamber further recalls  the  necessity to distinguish specific in- 
tent  from  motive.   The  personal motive  of the  perpetrator of the  crime  of 
genocide may be, for example, to obtain  personal economic benefits,  or politi- 
cal advantage or  some  form  of power.   The  existence  of a personal  motive 
does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to com- 
mit genocide. 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No.  IT-95-10-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 5, 
2001); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac,  Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102 
(Sept.  17,  2003)  (quoting Jelisic´ ,  Case  No.  IT-95-10-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 49); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 696 (quoting Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95- 
10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49). 
65.  Stakic´ , Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 45.  “[A]n  accused 
can  be found guilty of committing genocide even if his personal motivation went be- 
yond the  criminal  intent to commit  genocide.” Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR- 
2000-55A-T, Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept.  12, 2006). 
66.  See Stakic´ ,  Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 18 (“[E]vidence 
of intent to destroy may be inferred from an accused’s actions or utterances vis-a`-vis the 
targeted group . . . .”); Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 34 (“Where  direct  evi- 
dence of genocidal intent is absent,  the  intent may still be  inferred from  the  factual 
circumstances of the  crime.”);  Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, 
¶ 413 (Dec. 13, 2005) (“In the absence  of direct  evidence,  a perpetrator’s intent may be 
inferred from  relevant  facts and  circumstances.”); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judg- 
ment,  ¶ 704 (“The  Trial  Chamber notes  that  it is generally  accepted in the  jurispru- 
dence of the  Tribunal and  of the  ICTR that,  in  the  absence  of direct  evidence,  the 
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ference, that  inference must  be  the  only reasonable inference 
available on the evidence.”67   Some of the factors that have been 
looked  to for inferring specific intent include:   (a)  the  extent  of 
the  actual  destruction; (b)  the  existence  of a genocidal plan  or 
policy; (c)  the  perpetration and/or repetition of other destruc- 
tive or discriminatory acts committed as part of the same pattern 
of conduct; (d)  the utterances of the accused.68   Courts have also 
looked  to “the general context, the  perpetration of other culpa- 
ble acts systematically directed against  the same group, the scale 
of atrocities  committed, the systematic targeting of victims on 
account of their  membership of a particular group, or the repeti- 
tion  of destructive and  discriminatory acts.”69   “It is generally  ac- 
cepted, particularly in the jurisprudence of both  [the  ICTY] and 
the  Rwanda  Tribunal, that  genocidal dolus specialis can  be  in- 
ferred either from  the  facts, the  concrete circumstances, or  ‘a 
pattern of purposeful action.’ ”70 
The targeting of military-aged men  (which  might,  for exam- 
ple,  suggest  a tactic  of eliminating a potential military threat)71 
 
 
specific intent for genocide can be inferred from ‘the facts, the concrete circumstances, 
or a pattern of purposeful action.’ ”). 
67.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 41.  “Where  direct 
evidence  of genocidal intent is absent,  the  intent may still be inferred from  the  factual 
circumstances of the crime.   Where an inference needs  to be drawn, it has to be the only 
reasonable inference  available on the evidence.”  Brd–janin, Case No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 
¶ 970 (emphasis added). 
68.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 971-89. 
69.  Jelisic´,  Case  No.  IT-95-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 47; Simba, Case  No.  ICTR-01-76-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 413. 
70.  Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 526.  The  International Criminal  Tri- 
bunal  for Rwanda (“ICTR”)  has stated: 
In  the  light  of the  Tribunal’s jurisprudence, the  specific  intent of genocide 
may be inferred from certain  facts or indicia,  including but not limited  to (a) 
the  general context of the  perpetration of other culpable acts systematically 
directed against  that  same  group, whether these  acts were committed by the 
same  offender or  by others,  (b)  the  scale of atrocities  committed, (c)  their 
general nature, (d)  their  execution in a region  or a country,  (e)  the  fact that 
the victims were deliberately and systematically chosen  on account of their 
membership of a particular group, (f)  the  exclusion,  in this regard, of mem- 
bers  of other groups,  (g)  the  political  doctrine which  gave rise  to  the  acts 
referred to, (h) the  repetition of destructive and  discriminatory acts and  (i) 
the  perpetration of acts  which  violate  the  very foundation of the  group or 
considered as such  by their  perpetrators. 
Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶ 320 (Dec.  13, 2006). 
71.  See Krstic´ ,  Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 26 (“The  Trial 
Chamber rejected the  Defence’s  argument that  the  killing of [military-aged] men  was 
motivated solely by the  desire  to eliminate them  as a potential military threat.”). 
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has  sometimes   been  considered to  be  part  of  the  genocide,72 
and  sometimes  not.73   For example, in the  Krstic´ case, the  ICTY 
found the  killing  at Srebrenica of 7,000-8,000 Bosnian  Muslim 
men  was genocide because   the  targeting of  the  military-aged 
men  was part  of  the  destruction of  the  40,000  in  Srebrenica, 
since without  the  men,  the  group could  not  procreate.74 
Proof of the  mental  state for underlying acts or crimes  may 
serve as evidence  from  which to infer  specific intent.75   It is not 
 
 
72.  In Krstic´, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, in part,  reasoned that the killing of mili- 
tary-aged men was not just to eliminate a potential military threat because  both  civilians 
and  severely  handicapped were  also  killed.  See  Krstic´ ,  Case  No.  IT-98-33-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 26-27.  In  the  situation of Darfur,  both  civilians and  elderly 
have been  killed.  See infra note  286 and  accompanying text. 
73.  As explained in Brd–janin: 
[T]he victims of the  underlying acts in Article 4(2)(a) to (c),  particularly in 
camps  and  detention facilities, were predominantly, although not  only, mili- 
tary-aged  men.   This additional factor  could  militate  further against  the  con- 
clusion that  the existence  of genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference 
that  may be drawn from the evidence.   There is an alternative explanation for 
the  infliction  of these  acts on military-aged  men,  and  that  is that  the  goal was 
rather to eliminate any perceived threat to the  implementation of the  Strate- 
gic Plan in the [Autonomous Region of Krajina]  and beyond.   Security for the 
Bosnian  Serbs  seems  to have been  the  paramount interest.  In  the  words of 
one  witness:  “the aim was to reduce the  threat to the  detainer, the  detainer’s 
community, and anyone  . . . who looked  as if they would fight, once sent to the 
other side, would be eligible  for detention.” 
See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 979. 
74.  The  Appeals Chamber in Krstic´ explained: 
The  Trial Chamber determined that  Radislav Krstic´ had  the  intent to kill the 
Srebrenica Bosnian  Muslim men  of military age.  This finding  is one  of intent 
to commit  the requisite genocidal act—in this case, the killing of the members 
of the protected group, prohibited by Article 4(2)(a) of the Statute.  From this 
intent to kill, the  Trial  Chamber also drew  the  further inference that  Krstic´ 
shared  the genocidal intent of some members of the VRS [Army of Republika 
Srpska]  Main Staff to destroy a substantial  part of the targeted group, the Bos- 
nian  Muslims of Srebrenica. 
See Krstic´ ,  Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 21.  It further found: 
[T]he massacred  men  amounted to about  one  fifth of the  overall Srebrenica 
community. The Trial Chamber found that, given the patriarchal character of 
the Bosnian  Muslim society in Srebrenica, the  destruction of such  a sizeable 
number of men  would “inevitably result  in the  physical disappearance of the 
Bosnian  Muslim population at Srebrenica.”  Evidence  introduced at trial sup- 
ported this finding,  by showing  that,  with the  majority  of the  men  killed offi- 
cially listed as missing, their  spouses are unable to remarry  and,  consequently, 
to have new children.  The  physical destruction of the  men  therefore had  se- 
vere  procreative implications for  the  Srebrenica Muslim  community, poten- 
tially consigning the  community to extinction. 
Id. ¶ 28. 
75.  See id.  ¶ 20 (“The  proof  of the mental  state with respect  to the commission of 
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necessary to prove statements showing genocidal intent.76    An in- 
ference of genocidal intent may be drawn  even where  individu- 
als with intent are  not  precisely identified.77 
 
e.  Destruction of Cultural  and  Religious  Property May Be 
Evidence  of Intent to Destroy 
 
Where  physical or  biological  destruction occurs  simultane- 
ously, “attacks on cultural and  religious  property . . . may legiti- 
mately  be considered as evidence  of an  intent to physically de- 
stroy the  group.”78 
 
f. Sexual Violence  as Part  of Intent to Destroy 
 
Case law also recognizes  that  sexual  violence  can  form  an 
integral part  of the  process  of destruction of a group.  As the 
ICTR recognized in Prosecutor v. Akayesu :  the  “rapes resulted in 
physical and psychological  destruction of Tutsi women,  their 
families and  their  communities.  Sexual violence  was an integral 
part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi wo- 
men and specifically contributing to their  destruction and to the 
destruction of the  Tutsi group as a whole.”79 
 
2.  Factual  Information Suggesting  “Intent to Destroy” 
Is Satisfied 
 
In the situation of Darfur,  extensive factual information80 
strongly suggests that “intent  to destroy” exists on the part of the 
Government of Sudan  and  the  Janjaweed.   Of course,  in build- 
ing a case against  a particular individual, one  would,  to a large 
extent, want to  focus  on  that  individual’s  intent, although not 
 
the  underlying act can serve as evidence  from  which the  fact-finder  may draw the  fur- 
ther   inference that  the  accused   possessed  the  specific  intent to  destroy.”);  see  also 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 706. 
76.  See, e.g., Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 34.  (“The 
absence  of such  statements [indicating genocidal intent] is not  determinative.  Where 
direct  evidence  of genocidal intent is absent,  the  intent may still be inferred from  the 
factual  circumstances of the  crime.”).   Id. 
77.  See id. (“The  inference that  a particular atrocity  was motivated by genocidal 
intent may be drawn  . . . even where  the  individuals  to whom the  intent is attributable 
are  not  precisely identified.”); see also Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 707. 
78.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580. 
79.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept.  2, 1998). 
80.  The  Author  does  not  mean  to suggest  that  this factual  information would be 
“evidence” of the crimes, but rather, that  it is indicative  of the type of information that 
could  be collected by a court  (such  as the  International Criminal  Court). 
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exclusively.81    As mentioned above, the  bulk  of the  information 
cited  below  pertains to  crimes  committed in  2003  and  2004, 
which have also been  the years as to which the ICC’s initial inves- 
tigation  focused.82    By emphasizing crimes  committed in  those 
years, this Article does not mean  to suggest that  crimes have not 
continued—indeed, they have.83 
 
a.  The  Extent  of the  Actual Destruction 
 
As mentioned above, one of the indicators of whether there 
has been  “intent  to destroy”  is the  scope  of the  actual  destruc- 
 
81.  For example, it would be possible to show that  there was “intent  to destroy” by 
one  individual, and  another individual   knowingly  and  intentionally aided  the  first, 
which could  show that  the  second  person was an “aider  and  abetter”  of genocide. See, 
e.g., Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶¶ 330, 342 (Dec.  13, 
2006)  (considering the  utterances of others,  in determining whether the  accused  was 
aware of the intention of the attackers  to commit  genocide for case of aiding  and abet- 
ting  genocide).  Thus,  as explained in Brd–janin: 
Complicity  in  genocide, where  it consists  of  aiding  and  abetting genocide, 
does not  require proof  that  the  accomplice had  the  specific intent to destroy, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  a protected group.  In  that  case  the  Prosecution must 
prove  beyond  reasonable doubt “that  an  accused  knew that  his own acts as- 
sisted in the commission of genocide by the principal offender and was aware 
of the  principal offender’s state  of mind;  it need  not  show that  an  accused 
shared  the  specific intent of the  principal offender.” 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 730 (citation omitted). For aiding and abet- 
ting genocide, additionally, it must  be shown that  “[t]he aider  and  abettor carries  out 
acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend  moral  support to the perpetration 
of a certain  specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of 
civilian property, etc.),  and  this support has a substantial  effect upon the  perpetration 
of the crime.”  Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 45 (July  29, 2004)  (quoting Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case  No.  IT-98-32-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102 (Feb.  23, 2004)). 
82.  See Sixth Report, supra note  13, at 2.  The  Prosecutor recently  announced an 
intention to open  Sudan  investigations  in two new areas:  (a)  attacks on peacekeepers, 
and (b)  the pattern of attacks against those  who have been  displaced. See U.N. Security 
Council,  Statement  by Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: 
Statement to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR1593 (Dec.  5, 2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html. 
83.  According  to Human Rights Watch, in assessing the  situation in 2007: 
The situation in Darfur  remains  grave.  The violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law that Darfurians suffered  in recent years have con- 
tinued into  2007.   Government air  and  ground forces  have  repeatedly  con- 
ducted indiscriminate attacks in areas of rebel  activity, causing numerous civil- 
ian deaths  and  injuries.   Looting,  beatings,  murder, and  rape  perpetrated  pri- 
marily  (but   not  exclusively)  by government forces,  Janjaweed,  and  former 
rebels have created a climate of fear that impinges  on everyday life for millions 
of people in towns, villages, and  displaced persons  camps. 
CHAOS BY  DESIGN, supra note  2, at 14; see also Polgreen, supra note  32. 
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tion,  although extensive  actual  destruction is  not  required.84 
Here,  estimates  are that  200,000-400,000 have been  killed85 and 
2.5 million  displaced.86   Large  swaths of rural  Darfur  have been 
emptied of their  original  populations.87    These  facts and  those 
detailed further below clearly suggest that  there has been  exten- 
sive actual  destruction. 
 
b.  The  Perpetration and/or  Repetition of Destructive  or 
Discriminatory Acts Committed as Part  of the  Same 
Pattern of Conduct 
 
Here,  one clearly sees the perpetration and/or repetition of 
destructive or discriminatory acts committed as part  of the same 
pattern of conduct—another factor  from  which  genocide  may 
be inferred.88 
The  attacks,  at least during the  period in question, form  a 
clear pattern: (i)  there has been  clear coordination between  the 
Janjaweed  and  Government of Sudan  forces  to  target  the  Fur, 
Masalit  and  Zaghawa;  (ii)  the  Sudanese military  forces89   com- 
mence   with  aerial   bombardment  using   Antonovs   and   MiG 
planes  and attack helicopters;90 (iii) the Janjaweed then  move in 
on  foot  to kill, loot,  burn  and  perpetrate other crimes  at close 
range,  while government forces  move in by Land  Cruisers;  (iv) 
sometimes  military gunships reappear a few days after the initial 
 
84.  As stated  in Brd–janin: 
In view of the specific intent required for genocide, it is not necessary to prove 
the  de facto destruction of the  group in whole or in part.   Nevertheless, the  de 
facto destruction of the  group may constitute evidence  of the  specific  intent 
and  may also serve to  distinguish the  crime  of genocide from  the  inchoate 
offences  in Article 4(3)  of the  Statute,  such  as the  attempt to commit  geno- 
cide. 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36T, Judgment, ¶ 697. 
85.  See supra note  1 and  accompanying text. 
86.  See supra note  2 and  accompanying text. 
87.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 26. 
88.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 893-94. 
89.  Some of the  Sudanese armed  forces who participated in attacks in Darfur  are 
believed to come from the first and sixth Infantry  Divisions. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, 
supra note  10, at 33. 
90.  According  to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he rebel  groups  in Darfur  do not have 
aircraft,  so it can be assumed  that  the  Antonov  and  MiG planes  and  attack  helicopters 
used  to bomb  villages belong  to the  Sudanese armed  forces.  In addition, eyewitnesses 
have seen the Antonovs, MiGs, and helicopters at government airports in Darfur.” DAR- 
FUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 7 n.10.   The  Antonovs  dropped “barrel  bombs”  filled 
with metal  shards.  Id. at 24. 
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\31-4\FIN407.txt unknown Seq: 21 12-MAY-08 16:38  
 
 
 
 
1010 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:990 
 
attacks,  as if to verify that  the  village had  been  destroyed.91 
For example, witness statements reveal the  pattern of bom- 
bardment by government armed  forces  with the  Janjaweed  fol- 
lowing on  horseback to commit  crimes  at close range: 
• Sildi was attacked, first by air and then  by land, on February 
7, 2004.  Abdul, a forty-two-year-old farmer,  said two Antonovs 
bombed first, destroying  two huts and sending women and chil- 
dren running for shelter  in the  hills. “Then the Janjaweed and 
the government  came,” he  said.  “Twelve were killed  in the  vil- 
lage, then  it was burned.  Some  were killed  point-blank.”92 
• Another farmer,  forty-year-old Ahmad,  said he saw only one 
Antonov—at  8:00 a.m.  “At 9:00 am,”  he  said,  “the Janjaweed 
came with horses and camels and behind them the army with cars.” 
In  the  next  few days, thirty  villages of Sildi were looted  and 
burned.93 
• Tunfuka was attacked, by air and land,  on February  7, 2004, 
killing at least twenty-six people, according to villagers now in 
Chad.   Izhaq,  a twenty-four-year-old farmer,  said two Antonovs 
bombed for an hour and killed eight people —including three men, 
three children and two old women.  He said seven camels and 
thirteen cows were killed, and  the  village began  to burn. The 
army arrived in vehicles and the Janjaweed followed an hour  later, 
 
91.  According  to Human Rights Watch: 
Gunships have also been  used  to reconnoitre villages immediately after  they 
have  been  burned and  attacked   – arriving  within  one  to  three days of the 
initial  attacks,  according to villagers.  Sheikh  Abdullah  of Terbeba said gun- 
ships and  Antonovs flew over Terbeba three or four  days after  the  village was 
destroyed.  “They did  not  bomb,”  he  said.  “We think  they were looking  – to 
see what was there and  to make  sure  the  village was empty.” 
Id. at 25.  One  report, published on the U.S. Department of State website, characterizes 
the  “pattern” of attacks slightly differently: 
1) GOS [Government of Sudan] aircraft  or helicopters bomb  villages. 
2)  GOS soldiers  arrive  in  trucks,  followed  closely by Jingaweit  militia  riding 
horses  or camels. 
3) GOS soldiers  and  militia surround and  then  enter villages, under cover of 
gunfire. 
4) Fleeing  villagers are  targets  in aerial  bombing. 
5)  The  Jingaweit  and  GOS  soldiers  loot  the  village after  most  citizens  have 
fled, often  using  trucks  to remove  belongings. 
6) Villages often  experience multiple attacks over a prolonged period before 
they are  destroyed by burning or bombing. 
DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note  5, at 5. 
92.  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 17 (quoting a Human Rights Watch inter- 
view in Abdul on  March  29, 2004)  (emphasis added). 
93.  Id. (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Ahmad  on  March  29, 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
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shouting racial abuse,  shooting eighteen people dead  and 
looting  the  cattle.94 
• “On February  10, 2004, Antonov planes  bombed the village 
of Tullus  in  advance  of an  attack  on  the  village by 
Janjaweed.”95 
• “Antonovs  bombed Habila  six times  that  day,” he  said. 
“Twenty-four people were killed.   All were civilians.”96 
• “The attack [on  Terbeba] was done  by some 300 Janjaweed 
on horses and camels, accompanied by four government 
cars—three Land Cruisers carrying soldiers and a Renault  for 
logistics [ammunition].”97 
Countless  similar accounts exist.98   Those taking eye-witness testi- 
mony  have concluded that:   “Villages were not  attacked  at ran- 
dom,  but  were emptied across wide areas  in operations that  re- 
portedly  lasted  for  several  days or  were  repeated several  times 
until  the  population was finally driven  away.”99 
As part of these attacks, as detailed further below, a panoply 
of crimes  have been  committed, including murder—not only of 
military-age men,  but also of children, women  and the elderly— 
mass executions,100 torture, rape,  individuals  being  buried alive, 
detentions, denial   of  access  to  medical   treatment,101    looting, 
theft   of   cattle,   destruction  of   food   stocks,   destruction   of 
mosques,  and  burning of villages.102 
 
94.  Id. at 18 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Izhaq, Chad on April 14, 
2004)  (emphasis added). 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. at 25. 
97.  Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
98.  See generally,  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8; ENTRENCHING   IMPUNITY, supra 
note  10. 
99.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 26. 
100.  See infra Part  II.F.1. 
101.  See infra Part  II.F.2. 
102.  See infra Part  II.F.3.  The  U.N. Commission of Inquiry  found that  the  crimes 
committed in Darfur  included: 
[I]ndiscriminate attacks on civilians, killing of civilians, killing of detained en- 
emy servicemen,  killing of wounded enemy servicemen,  wanton  destruction of 
villages or  devastation not  justified  by military  necessity,  forcible  transfer of 
civilian populations, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, outrages 
upon personal dignity and  cruel,  inhuman or degrading treatment, plunder, 
unlawful confinement, incommunicado detentions and enforced disappear- 
ances,  and  recruitment and  use  of children under the  age  of 15 in  armed 
hostilities. 
Mathew, supra note  7, at 535-36. 
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As to the  coordination between  the  Government of Sudan 
(or its armed  forces)  and the Janjaweed militias, that can be seen 
not only from their  joint operations, but the fact that, as detailed 
further below, Sudanese armed  forces  have recruited the 
Janjaweed,  and  provided them  with weapons,  ammunition, 
uniforms, communication equipment and  vehicles.103 
 
c.  Ethnically  Charged Utterances 
 
There are  numerous accounts of racially charged epithets 
accompanying the killing—another factor that is used to infer 
genocidal intent.104    For example, eyewitnesses have stated: 
• “They  came  into  Kondoli  saying:   ‘Kill the Nuba! Kill the 
Nuba!’ They  shot  a child  who  was lying on  the  ground  be- 
cause  he  was afraid.   They said:  ‘Get up  so we can  see you.’ 
But  he  was afraid.   So  they  shot  him.   He  was called  Maji 
Gumr  Zahkariah and  he  was three years old.”105 
• “[S]even  army Land  Cruisers  came.   The  Janjaweed  arrived 
an hour  later.  They burned the village, rounded up the cattle 
and  shot  people who were running away.  They  killed  eigh- 
teen  people. Then  the Janjaweed left with the cattle followed 
by the  government.  The  Janjaweed  were shouting:  ‘Kill the 
Nuba!’”106 
• “The Janjaweed were shouting: ‘Kill all the Nuba!’ About 90 
percent of them  were  wearing  army  uniforms and  the  rest 
were in ordinary clothes.”107 
• “It was 2:30 p.m.,  time  for prayers.   The  Janjaweed  went in, 
on  foot  and  on  horseback, and  killed  ten  people including 
the imam, Yahya Gabat.  Then  they turned and started  shoot- 
ing  into  the  market.  The  bullets  were  falling  like rain  and 
they were shouting:  ‘Kill the Nuba! Kill the Nuba!’ They killed 
my seventy-five-year-old aunt,  Kaniya Hassan,  because  she re- 
 
103.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 65. 
104.  See  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 985-88 (Sep- 
tember 1, 2004);  see also Prosecutor v. Stakic´,  Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals  Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 52 (March  22, 2006) (“[E]thnic slurs . . . might  reasonably be understood 
as an implied  call for the  group’s  destruction.”). 
105.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 14-15 (emphasis added).  “Nuba” refers 
to  people from  the  Nuba  Mountains of  central   Sudan,  but  is used  derogatorily by 
Janjaweed  and  others  to refer  to ethnic  Africans. Id. at 15 n.29; see also ENTRENCHING 
IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 16 n.35. 
106.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 18 (describing the  attack  in  Tunfuka) 
(emphasis added). 
107.  Id. at 20 (describing the  attack  on  Terbeba) (emphasis added). 
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fused  to let them  take her  sheep  and  goats.”108 
• “The  Janjaweed  came  and  surrounded the  market.  At first 
people thought they had  come  to protect it.  But then  they 
began  to shout:   ‘Kill the Nuba!’ and  they attacked.  They had 
RPGS and  M79 grenade launchers and  killed  many  people 
and  stole everything  from  the  market.”109 
• “The Janjaweed brought camels into the village and they ate 
all the sorghum. They burned the village and stole all my 
things–including fourteen  cows.  They  were  shouting:  ‘Kill 
the Nuba! Kill the Nuba!’  All this is because  we are black.  We 
could  defend ourselves  against  the  Arab  nomads, but  not 
against  the  Janjaweed.   The  government has given them  very 
good  guns  and  attacks with them.”110 
• Adam, a thirty-two-year-old farmer  burned out of Gokar  vil- 
lage near  Geneina, said a Janjaweed leader  in Geneina, Omda 
Saef, told local people:   “This place is for Arabs, not Africans.”111 
• One  victim described radio  conversation he had  overheard 
from Sudanese army pilots:  “in their  conversations on the ra- 
dio  they  called  us ‘Nuba,  abid,’  and  said  things  like,  ‘I am 
going to give those slaves a lesson they will not forget.’”112 
• A twenty-seven-year-old Fur  man  from  Arwalla who was ar- 
rested  and  beaten said those  doing  the  beatings  insulted the 
victims, saying:  “You slaves, this is not  your country.”113 
• An eyewitness to the  August 15, 2003 attack  on Bindisi said 
that  the  leader  of the  attack,  Ali Kosheib,114  was screaming 
during the  attack:   “Nuba,  Nuba,  you are  monarada [opposi- 
tion], you are all slaves.”115 
Those  being  attacked  have explained:  “The  government  wants 
 
108.  Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
109.  Id. (emphasis added). 
110.  Id. at 30 (emphasis added).  The African tribes refer  to themselves  as “black,” 
as a way of distinguishing themselves  from the Janjaweed attackers.   It should  be noted, 
however,  that  the  Janjaweed  are  also dark  in skin color. 
111.  Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
112.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 16 (quoting a Human Rights Watch 
interview conducted in a refugee  camp  in Chad  on June  29, 2005)  (emphasis added). 
“Abid” is Arabic for slave. Id. 
113.  Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
114.  Kosheib  was also described as giving orders  during the  attack,  and  present 
during a March  2004 attack  on  Tanako.  Id. 
115.  Id. (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview conducted in a refugee  camp 
in Chad  on  June  27, 2005)  (emphasis added).  The  most commonly  used  epithets are 
“abid” (slave)  and  “zurga” (blue/black or dirty/black).  “Nuba” is not  used  more  com- 
monly  than  those.   Interview  with Eric Reeves, supra note  6. 
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to  kill all African  people, Muslim  or  not  Muslim,  so as to  put 
Arabs in their  places,”116  and  “they killed  everything  black  . . . 
they don’t  want African  tribes  in this place.”117    The  Janjaweed 
have also been  described as rendering “Arabization”  services to 
the Government of Sudan.118   According  to survivors who fled an 
attack on Hamada on January 13-14, 2005, the Janjaweed  attack- 
ers  repeatedly  stated   their   intention  of  “cleaning   the   whole 
area.”119 
 
d.  The  Existence  of a Genocidal Plan  or Policy 
 
There also appears to be both  inferential evidence  of a joint 
Government of  Sudan/Janjaweed “plan  or  policy”  of  destruc- 
tion,  and  possibly actual  evidence  of such a “plan or policy.”  As 
noted above, the law suggests that a plan or policy of destruction 
can be a strong  indicator of intent, although it is not required.120 
The   coordination  between    the   Government  of   Sudan 
armed   forces   and   the   Janjaweed—discussed  above—suggests 
that  there was a plan  to  attack  the  Fur,  Masalit and  Zaghawa. 
Additionally,  it is possible  that  command and  control lines were 
or are  actually intertwined:121 
 
116.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 28. 
117.  Id. at 27. 
118.  See id. at 29. 
119.  ENTRENCHING   IMPUNITY, supra note  10,  at  55  (quoting interviews  with  dis- 
placed  people from Hamada conducted in January, 2005).  As explained by a report on 
the  U.S. State Department  website: 
Numerous credible reports corroborate the  use of racial  and  ethnic  epithets 
by both  the Jingaweit and  GOS military personnel; “[k]ill the slaves; [k]ill  the 
slaves!” and “[w]e have orders  to kill all the blacks” are common. One  refugee 
reported a militia member stating, “[w]e kill all blacks and even kill our cattle 
when  they have black calves.” 
DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note  5, at 5. 
120.  See supra note  54 and  accompanying text  (discussing legal requirements for 
the existence  of a plan or policy); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 260 (Nov. 27, 2007)  (“[A]ccording to the  jurisprudence of this 
Tribunal as well as that  of the  ICTY the  existence  of an agreement or a plan  is not  an 
element required for a conviction  for genocide.”).  As to the  U.N. Commission of In- 
quiry’s conclusion that  “no  genocidal policy  has  been  pursued and  implemented in 
Darfur,”  Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 642, not  only is the  law clear  that  there 
need  not be a genocidal policy, but  the  facts below clearly suggest  that  the  killing has 
been  pursuant to a plan  or policy. 
121.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 32 (suggesting that responsibility 
for  Sudanese military  and  possibly Janjaweed  crimes  would  go up  the  chain  of com- 
mand  to former  Minister  of Defence  Maj. Gen. Bakr Hassan Salih, Chief of Staff Abbas 
Arabi, and  President El Bashir as the  Commander-in-Chief). 
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• For  example, in  a  remarkable  admission, one  Sudanese 
army official stated that all of Janjaweed leader  Musa Hilal’s 
operations were under the  control of the  army.122 
 
• Some Janjaweed  appear to have been  incorporated into  va- 
rious  units  of the  security  forces  or  the  Central  Reserve Po- 
lice.123 
 
• On  one  occasion,  Janjaweed  Commander Musa  Hilal  was 
overheard prior  to a February  27, 2004 attack  on  Tawila on 
“Thurayas [satellite phone] with someone in Khartoum, to ar- 
range  the  point  where  the  plane  should  land  to bring  the  re- 
quired ammunition” to the  Janjaweed.124 
 
• Additionally,   a  forty-two-year old  Zaghawa  man  reported 
that  Janjaweed  commander Musa Hilal gave “orders  to both 
soldiers  and  Janjaweed.”125 
 
• At a mass execution of several hundred men  at Wadi Saleh, 
discussed  further below,126 high  level government officials127 
were present while the Janjaweed and soldiers carried out the 
attacks;128   Wadi Saleh victims were first detained in police or 
military custody prior  to execution by the Janjaweed and 
soldiers.129 
 
• As part  of several attacks  on  villages in the  Kutum  area,  a 
former  Sudanese army soldier  heard a Sudanese army com- 
mander named Major  Gaddal  Fadlallah   give clear  instruc- 
tions  to  attack  civilians, stating:   “On  your  way, every house 
and  village needs  to be burned completely.   I do not  want to 
see any left after the  battle.”  He added:   “All men,  even civil- 
ians that  you see should  be killed.”130   Others observed  that 
 
 
122.  See id. at 12 (citing  a Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Gen. Mohamed 
Fazey of the  Sudan  army in Fashir,  North Darfur,  on  Oct.  6, 2004). 
123.  See id. at 54. 
124.  Id. at 17 (quoting a Human Rights Watch  interview  with a trader in North 
Darfur  on  Oct.  4, 2004). 
125.  Id.  at  18 (quoting a Human Rights  Watch  interview  in  a refugee  camp  in 
Chad  on  July 2, 2005). 
126.  See infra Part  II.F.1. 
127.  The  then-commissioners of Mukjar, El Tayib Abdallah  Torshain, and  of Gar- 
sila, Ja’afar Abdul el Hakh,  were present. See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 
24. 
128.  See id.  The Janjaweed were commanded by “Ali Kosheib,” which is apparently 
the  nom de guerre of Ali Mohammed Ali, an ex-army soldier.  See id. at 25. 
129.  See id. 
130.  Id. at 44 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview  with a former  army sol- 
dier  in Darfur  on  July 14, 2005). 
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the  Janjaweed  were “commanded by a military officer.”131 
 
• Sudanese security  officials are  believed  to serve as liaisons 
with Janjaweed leaders,  and military intelligence is believed to 
have been  a conduit for supplies  for the  Janjaweed.132 
 
• The  Janjaweed  have also stated  “we are the  government”133 
and  wear uniforms similar to government uniforms.134 
 
It is also clear  that  the  Government of Sudan  has taken  no seri- 
ous steps to prevent  or punish those  implicated in crimes.135    In- 
deed,  recently,  the government of Sudan  promoted Janjaweed 
militia  leader,  Musa Hilal to an official government position.136 
All of this coordinated action  by the Janjaweed and Government 
armed   forces  is circumstantial evidence  that  there was a joint 
plan  to attack  the  Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa. 
Furthermore, there is some suggestion  that  there may have 
been  an  actual  plan  memorialized in government memoranda. 
For  example, there appear to  be  government documents that 
authorize the  recruitment and  arming  of the  Janjaweed  militia, 
“provision of military support to allied ethnic  groups,  and in one 
case, provid[ing] relative impunity  for abuses committed by 
Janjaweed  militia  members against  civilians.”137    For example: 
 
• A November 22, 2003, letter  from  South  Darfur  governor 
Adam Hamid  Musa to the  commissioner of Nyala and  then- 
commissioner of Kass requests  the commissioners to “prepare 
for the recruitment of three hundred knights  [Janjaweed] for 
 
 
131.  Id. at 45 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Khartoum on October 
21, 2004). 
132.  See id. at 51. 
133.  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 14, 30.  “ ‘We are the government!’ Time 
and again, members of Darfur’s Masalit community told Human Rights Watch that this 
was the response of the Janjaweed—at  checkpoints, in the streets, in the course  of rob- 
beries  or cattle  rustling—whenever civilians attempted to defend themselves  and  their 
property.” Id. at 42. 
134.  See id. at 45 (noting that  the  Janjaweed  are “headed by officers who wear the 
same  stripes  as generals  in the  regular army.  The  only difference between  Janjaweed 
and  army  uniforms, Masalit  say, is a  badge  depicting an  armed   horseman that  the 
Janjaweed  sport  on  their  breast  pocket.”). 
135.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 63.  The  International  Commis- 
sion of Inquiry  on Darfur  to the  United Nations  Secretary-General has also concluded 
that  “[t]he Sudanese justice system is unable and  unwilling  to address  the  situation in 
Darfur.”  Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, at 5. 
136.  See Sudan Gives Advisor Role to Militia Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A8. 
137.  DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 4. 
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Khartoum.”138 
 
• Another memorandum dated  February  12, 2004, outlines 
the necessary step of “designing a plan for resettlement oper- 
ations  of nomads [Janjaweed] in places  from  which the  out- 
laws [African  Tribes]  withdrew  . . . .”139 
 
• A further memorandum dated  February  13, 2004 orders  se- 
curity units  to “allow [or  permit] the  activities of the 
mujahadeen  and   the   volunteers under  the   command  of 
Sheikh  Musa Hilal [the  Janjaweed] to proceed in the  area  of 
[North Darfur] and  to secure  their  vital needs.”140 
 
• The  document continues:  “We also  highlight the  impor- 
tance  of non-interference so as not  to question their  authori- 
ties and to overlook minor offences by the mujahadeen 
[Janjaweed] against  civilians who are  suspected members of 
the  rebellion . . . .”141 
 
• Another document, marked “highly confidential” provides 
that  the  Janjaweed  will “protect”  internally displaced Darfuri- 
ans in camps.142 
 
• An unauthenticated document seized from a Janjaweed offi- 
cial, dated  August 2005, calls for the  “execution of all direc- 
tives  from  the  president of  the  republic.”  The  document 
urges  regional  commanders  and  security  officials  to: 
“Change  the  demography of Darfur  and  make it void of Afri- 
can  tribes,”  and   encourages  “killing,  burning villages  and 
farms,  terrorizing people, confiscating property from  mem- 
bers of African tribes  and  forcing  them  from  Darfur.”143 
As mentioned above, there are  also references to “Arabization” 
being conducted,144 so that the plan may in fact have a name 
(although  it  is  unclear  whether  those   who  perpetrated  or 
planned the  killings used  that  term). 
 
 
138.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 22; DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 
10, at 7. 
139.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 23. 
140.  Id. at 23; DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 5. 
141.  DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 5. 
142.  See id. at 9 (citing  the  “highly confidential” February  2004 memorandum). 
143.  Nicholas  D. Kristof, The Secret Genocide  Archive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at 
A19.  Kristof noted that the document is possibly a forgery, although the African Union 
believes  it  to  be  authentic. See  id.; see  also WILLIAM  G.  O’NEILL  & VIOLETTE   CASSIS, 
BROOKINGS  INSTITUTE-UNIV. OF BERN,  PROTECTING  TWO MILLION  INTERNALLY DISPLACED: 
THE SUCCESSES  AND SHORTCOMINGS  OF THE AFRICAN  UNION  IN  DARFUR (2005). 
144.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 28-29. 
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e.  Destruction of Cultural  and  Religious  Property as Added 
Evidence  of Intent to Destroy 
 
The  attacks also show destruction of “cultural  and  religious 
property” which,  while not  in and  of itself a form  of genocide, 
again  helps  to show intent.145 
As to the  destruction of cultural property, for example, the 
U.S. Congress  and  Human Rights  Watch,  as mentioned  above, 
have  characterized the  joint  Government of  Sudan  and 
Janjaweed  militia  attacks as “scorched-earth tactics,”146  in which 
everything  within  the  villages in Darfur  has been  destroyed: 
Since  August  2003,  wide swathes  of [the  homelands]of the 
Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa],  among  the  most fertile  in the  re- 
gion,  have been  burned and  depopulated.  With rare  excep- 
tions,  the  countryside is now emptied of its original  Masalit 
and Fur inhabitants. Everything that can sustain and [succor] 
life—livestock, food stores, wells and  pumps,  blankets  and 
clothing—has been  looted  or destroyed.  Villages have been 
torched not  randomly, but  systematically—often   not  once, 
but  twice.147 
Because  virtually nothing is left remaining of villages that  were 
attacked, any cultural property was destroyed. 
As to  the  destruction of  religions   property, there are  ac- 
counts  of Government and  Janjaweed  forces  having  “burned at 
least sixty-five mosques  in Dar Masalit.”148    The  “Janjaweed who 
attacked  Urum  in November 2003 killed  . . . the  imam  and  his 
orphaned  three-year-old grandson.”149   The “Janjaweed also rode 
into  the  mosque  in  Mulli and  shot  dead  ten  people including 
the  imam  . . . .”150   There are also reports of Janjaweed  defecat- 
ing on  Korans.151 
 
f. Sexual Violence  as Added  Evidence  of Intent to Destroy 
 
Finally, the  law also suggests that  sexual  violence  can  help 
 
145.  See Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
146.  Comprehensive Peace  in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(7),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006); 
DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 7. 
147.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 2. 
148.  Id. at 28.  Human Rights Watch has created a list of some of the mosques  that 
were burned in Dar Masalit.  See id. at 66, Appendix C. 
149.  Id. at 28. 
150.  Id. 
151.  See id. 
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show intent to destroy.152   There are numerous eyewitness ac- 
counts  of rape.   For instance, according to testimony  of one  sur- 
vivor:  “The  Janjaweed  took  girls into  the  grass and  raped them 
there—in Dingo and Koroma.   They raped thirteen including 
eighteen-year-old Khadija.”153    “Near Sissi, three women,  aged 
thirty-two, twenty-two and  twenty-five, were abducted at a water 
hole and taken  to Nouri school, which was abandoned, and were 
raped.”154   “In the  village of Dureysa, on the  Masalit-Fur border, 
a seventeen-year-old girl who resisted  rape was killed and her na- 
ked  body left on  the  street.”155   Between  November 30 and  De- 
cember 2, 2004, those women and girls who had not managed to 
leave Adwah were raped.156    As part  of the  January  13-14, 2005 
attack  on Hamada, the  Janjaweed  raped women  and  girls, some 
repeatedly.157   One  woman  reported being  raped repeatedly by 
Sudanese military  and  Janjaweed  in  front  of her  father;  after- 
wards, her  father  was dismembered in front  of her.158    Another 
woman was held for a week against her will and repeatedly raped 
in  front   of  her   nine-month-old daughter;  they  eventually   es- 
caped  to  a  refugee   camp  in  Southern Chad.159    According   to 
Human Rights  Watch,  “[r]ape appears to be  a feature of most 
attacks in Fur, Masalit, and  Zaghawa areas  of Darfur;”  however, 
the  extent  of the  rape  is difficult  to determine because  the  sub- 
ject is not  freely discussed.160    One  survey reported that  sixteen 
percent of respondents indicated that  they  had  been  raped or 
 
 
152.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept.  2, 
1998). 
153.  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting a Human Rights Watch inter- 
view in Chad  on  March  28, 2004). 
154.  Id. at 34 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Feisal, Darfur,  on April 
5, 2004). 
155.  Id. 
156.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 38. 
157.  See id. at 43. 
158.  See DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note  5, at 5. 
159.  See id. 
160. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 33.  Congress  has referred to “the 
systematic rape  of thousands of women  and girls . . . .” Comprehensive Peace in Sudan 
Act of 2004 § 3(9),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006).   For  an  extensive  discussion  of rape  in 
Darfur,  see TARA GINGERICH  & JENNIFER  LEANING, U.S. AGENCY FOR  INT’L  DEV./OTI, THE 
USE   OF  RAPE AS  A  WEAPON OF  WAR  IN THE  CONFLICT  IN DARFUR, SUDAN  (2004),  available 
at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/the-use-of-rape- 
as-a-weapon.pdf.  A Darfurian NGO had documented 9,300 cases of rape by 2004.  Id. at 
16. 
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heard of someone being  raped.161 
 
g.  Displacement in Deplorable Conditions as Added  Evidence 
of Intent to Destroy 
 
As mentioned above, the law is somewhat  unsettled whether 
displacement can be viewed as an additional indicator of “intent 
to  destroy,”  although the  majority  view appears to  be  that  it 
can.162    Accordingly,  a possible  additional argument would  be 
that  the  conditions in which the  displacement occurred were so 
deplorable that  they suggested  a more  slow moving,  but  none- 
theless lethal,  attempt to destroy, among  others,  the Fur, Masalit 
and  Zaghawa.163   The  argument would be that  because:   (a)  the 
conditions  of  displacement—where  those   displaced  had   no 
“means of sustenance or shelter”164—were insufficient to sustain 
life;165  and  (b)  attacks have continued against  displaced persons 
in  “camps,”  the  way in  which  the  displacement occurred  pro- 
vides added indications of  intent to  destroy.   Indeed, Human 
Rights Watch has concluded: 
The subsequent denial  of humanitarian assistance to this pop- 
ulation by the government of Sudan,  in conditions where the 
population has been  rendered entirely  dependent on  relief, 
can  also be  considered as part  of a strategy  to  weaken  and 
perhaps destroy  a large  proportion of the  displaced popula- 
tion  and  prevent  their  return to their  home  villages.166 
 
As to the  displacement occurring in deplorable conditions, 
that  cannot be denied.  Civilians displaced into  camps  have suf- 
fered  tremendously due to inadequate humanitarian assis- 
tance—which has sometimes  even been  blocked  by the  Govern- 
 
 
161.  See DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note  5, at 5. 
162.  See supra notes  59-65 and  accompanying text. 
163.  The  crime  of “[d]eliberately inflicting  on  the  group conditions of life calcu- 
lated  to bring  about  its physical destruction” covers methods of destruction by which 
the  perpetrator does  not  immediately kill group members, but  which, ultimately,  seek 
their  physical destruction. Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 517 
(July 31, 2003). 
164.  Comprehensive Peace in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(12),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2004) 
(discussing  the   Sudanese  government’s restriction  of  access  on  humanitarian and 
human rights  workers to the  Darfur  area). 
165.  Indeed, one estimate  is that “one in three children in the refugee  settlements 
in Chad  is suffering  from acute  malnutrition.” DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note  5, 
at 3. 
166.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 40. 
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ment  of Sudan.167    Those  displaced have largely been  deprived 
of  their  assets,  land,  security,  and  freedom of  movement;  be- 
cause they are confined in camps and unable to access their  land 
or even the  wild foods, markets,  and  labor  migration that  could 
normally  sustain them  in times of crisis, they are entirely  depen- 
dent   on  humanitarian  assistance.168    As to  crimes  continuing 
against those displaced, eyewitness accounts indicate that militias 
continue to attack  displaced civilians, “beating  women  and  chil- 
dren who attempt to leave these  settlements in order to collect 
firewood,  wild foods or other essential items, and sometimes  kill- 
ing them;  women  have been  raped.”169   According  to a 2007 re- 
port: 
People  forced  to flee their  homes  who make it into the camps 
invariably  find  themselves   trapped  there.  If  they  venture 
outside  to collect firewood, farm, or attempt to return to their 
villages  they  risk  being  harassed,   robbed, beaten, or  mur- 
dered by Janjaweed  or  other armed  men.   Women  and  girls 
attempting to carry out  the  routine activities of daily life are 
often  sexually harassed and  raped by these  armed  men,  who 
include government forces  or  even  former  rebels  who once 
claimed  to be fighting  on behalf  of their  victims.  Insufficient 
security in the  camps  has exacerbated problems of domestic 
violence  and  sexual  exploitation.170 
Men have also been  tortured and  killed.171 
Accordingly, in the situation of Darfur,  there is a plethora of 
factual  information suggesting  the  existence   of  “intent   to  de- 
stroy.”  In fact, virtually every indicator that the law suggests as to 
“intent  to destroy” appears to be present. One  has to wonder,  if 
this is not enough evidence  of “intent  to destroy,” what evidence 
would be enough?  Raphael  Lemkin—who coined  the  term  “ge- 
nocide”172—clearly indicated that  “genocide”  did  not  need  to 
wait until entire groups  were actually destroyed;  that is why geno- 
cide  is an  intent crime,  and  prohibits destruction of protected 
groups  not  only “in whole” but  “in part.”173 
 
167.  See id. at 50. 
168.  See id. at 58-59. 
169.  Id. at 42. 
170.  CHAOS BY  DESIGN, supra note  2, at 17. 
171.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 42. 
172.  See Jack, supra note  36, at 708. 
173.  See  Prosecutor v. Simba,  Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (Dec. 13, 
2005)  (“To find an accused  guilty of the  crime  of genocide it must be established that 
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B. The Requirement of “In Whole or In Part” 
 
1.  The  Legal Criteria 
 
The  next  requirement of  genocide’s dolus specialis is that 
there be  intent to  destroy  a group or  groups  “in whole  or  in 
part.”   As to this requirement, case law explains  that  there must 
be intent to destroy a distinct part of the group, not isolated  indi- 
viduals within  it:174 
Although the  perpetrators of genocide need  not  seek to de- 
stroy  the  entire group protected by  the  Convention,  they 
must view the  part  of the  group they wish to destroy  as a dis- 
tinct  entity  which  must  be  eliminated as such.   A campaign 
resulting in  the  killings,  in  different places  spread   over  a 
broad  geographical area, of a finite number of members of a 
protected group might  not  thus  qualify as genocide, despite 
the  high  total  number of  casualties,  because   it  would  not 
show an intent by the perpetrators to target  the very existence 
of the  group as such.   Conversely, the  killing of all members 
of the  part  of a group located  within  a small  geographical 
area,  although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would 
qualify as genocide if carried out  with the  intent to  destroy 
the part  of the group as such located  in this small geographi- 
cal area.175 
 
 
he  committed any of the  enumerated acts . . . with the  specific  intent to  destroy,  in 
whole or in part,  a group, as such, that  is defined by one of the protected categories of 
nationality, race,  ethnicity,  or religion.”). 
174.  As explained by the  Trial  Chamber in Brd–janin: 
[U]nder the  Genocide Convention, the  terms  “in whole or in part”  speak  to 
the intended scope of destruction, as opposed to the actual destruction of the 
group . . . .  The  Trial Chamber agrees  with the  Krstic´ and  Stakic´ Trial Cham- 
bers that  “the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part,  means  seeking  to 
destroy a distinct  part  of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated 
individuals  within  it.” 
Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 700 (Sept.  1, 2004); see Prose- 
cutor  v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (July 31, 2003).  The Trial Cham- 
ber  in Krstic´ explained: 
[T]he intent to destroy a group, even if only in part,  means  seeking to destroy 
a distinct  part  of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated  individ- 
uals within it.  Although the perpetrators of genocide need  not seek to destroy 
the  entire group protected by the  Convention, they must view the  part  of the 
group they  wish to  destroy  as a distinct  entity  which  must  be  eliminated as 
such. 
Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
175.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590. 
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a.  Requirement of a “Substantial  Part” 
 
Where  the  entire group is not  targeted for destruction, but 
only a “part” of the  group, case law specifies that  the  part  of the 
group  targeted  must   be   a  “substantial”   part   of  the   whole 
group.176   Thus,  the  Appeals Chamber in Krstic´ explained: 
It is well established that  where  a conviction  for genocide re- 
lies on the  intent to destroy  a protected group “in part,”  the 
part  must be a substantial  part  of that  group. The aim of the 
Genocide Convention is to  prevent  the  intentional  destruc- 
tion  of entire human groups,  and  the  part  targeted must  be 
significant   enough to  have  an  impact   on  the  group as  a 
whole.177 
The Appeals Chamber in Krstic´ further opined on when the 
 
176.  See, e.g., Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (“Although there is 
no  numeric threshold, the  perpetrator must  act  with the  intent to  destroy  at least  a 
substantial  part  of the  group.”); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept.  12, 2006) (“While there is no upper or lower limit to the num- 
ber  of victims from  the  protected group, the  Prosecution must  prove  beyond  reasona- 
ble doubt that the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy at least a substantial  part 
of the  group.”). 
177.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 8.  The Krstic´ deci- 
sion continued: 
The question has also been  considered by Trial Chambers of the ICTR, whose 
Statute   contains   an  identical definition  of  the  crime  of  genocide.   These 
Chambers arrived  at the  same  conclusion.  In  Kayishema, the  Trial  Chamber 
concluded, after  having  canvassed  the  authorities interpreting the  Genocide 
Convention, that the term  “ ‘in part’ requires the intention to destroy a consid- 
erable  number of individuals  who are part  of the  group.”   This definition was 
accepted and refined by the Trial Chambers in Bagilishema and Semanza, which 
stated  that  the  intent to destroy  must  be, at least, an intent to destroy  a sub- 
stantial  part  of the  group. 
Id. ¶ 9. 
In the Krstic´ case, the Appeals Chamber held that “[t]he intent requirement of 
genocide under Article 4 of the  Statute  is therefore satisfied where  evidence 
shows that  the  alleged  perpetrator intended to  destroy  at least a substantial 
part  of the protected group.”   It further stated  that  “the substantiality  require- 
ment  both  captures genocide’s defining character as a crime  of massive pro- 
portions and  reflects  the  Convention’s concern with the  impact  the  destruc- 
tion  of the  targeted part  will have on  the  overall survival of the  group.” 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 701; see Krstic´,  Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judg- 
ment,  ¶ 634 (“[A]n  intent to destroy only part  of the group must nevertheless concern 
a substantial  part  thereof, either numerically or  qualitatively.”);  Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, 
Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Dec. 14, 1999) (“[I]t is widely acknowledged that 
the  intention to destroy  must  target  at least a substantial part  of the  group.”) (citation 
omitted); Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 10-11 (discussing 
the  sources  of  the  “substantial   part”  requirement,  including Raphael   Lemkin,   who 
coined  the term  genocide and was instrumental in drafting the Genocide Convention). 
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targeted part of the group satisfies the “substantial  part” require- 
ment: 
The determination of when the targeted part  is substantial 
enough to  meet  this  [substantial part] requirement may in- 
volve a  number of  considerations.  The  numeric size of the 
targeted part of the group is the necessary  and important starting 
point, though not in all cases the ending point  of the inquiry. 
The  number of individuals  targeted should  be evaluated not 
only in absolute  terms,  but  also in relation to the  overall size 
of the  entire group.  In  addition to the  numeric size of the 
targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful 
consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of 
the  overall group, or is essential  to its survival, that  may sup- 
port  a finding  that  the  part  qualifies as substantial  within the 
meaning of Article 4.178 
 
 
b.  Destruction May Be Limited  to a Geographical Zone 
 
Case law also establishes  that destruction may be limited  to a 
geographical zone.179     Thus,  the  Trial  Chamber in  Krstic´ ex- 
plained:  “the physical destruction may target  only a part  of the 
geographically limited  part  of the  larger  group because  the  per- 
petrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction as suf- 
ficient  to  annihilate the  group as a distinct  entity  in  the  geo- 
graphic  area  at issue.”180   Thus  for example, the  Trial Chamber 
in Stakic´ suggested  that  destruction even within a single munici- 
pality might  constitute genocide,181   although it noted that  that 
approach “might distort  the definition of genocide if it is not 
applied with caution.”182 
 
 
178.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 12, 14 (emphasis 
added). 
179.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (“[T]he jurisprudence of 
the Tribunal supports the approach that  permits  a [characterization] of genocide even 
when the specific intent to destroy a group, in part, extends only to a limited  geographi- 
cal area.”);  see also Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 83. 
180.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590. 
181.  Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 523 (July 31, 2003). 
182.  Id.  (“In  construing the  phrase   ‘destruction of  a  group in  part,’  the  Trial 
Chamber with some hesitancy  follows the  jurisprudence of the  Yugoslavia and  Rwanda 
Tribunals which permits  a [characterization] of genocide even when the specific intent 
extends only to a limited  geographical area,  such  as a municipality.”); see also Luban, 
supra note  4, at 313 (arguing that “once the group is reinterpreted as a ‘group-within-a- 
given-territory,’  the difference between  genocide and the crime against humanity of 
extermination begins  to thin  dramatically.”). 
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Applying  these   criteria,   for  example,  the   ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in  Krstic´ concluded that  the  targeting of 40,000  Bos- 
nian   Muslims  of  Srebrenica  was  a  “substantial   part”   of  the 
targeted group.183    There, the  Appeals Chamber found that  the 
Army  of   Republika  Srpska   Main   Staff  and   Radislav   Krstic 
targeted the “Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, or the Bosnian 
Muslims of Eastern  Bosnia.”184    The  size of the  Bosnian  Muslim 
population in Srebrenica prior  to its capture by the Army of 
Republika Srpska  forces  in  1995  amounted to  approximately 
forty thousand people.185    While  the  court  concluded that  the 
40,000 “constituted only a small percentage of the  overall  Mus- 
lim population of Bosnia and  Herzegovina at the  time,” it held 
that  “the importance of the  Muslim community of Srebrenica is 
not captured solely by its size.”186   The court  found relevant  that 
Srebrenica was of “immense  strategic  importance to the Bosnian 
Serb leadership”187 and that “Srebrenica was important due to its 
prominence in  the  eyes of both  the  Bosnian  Muslims and  the 
international community”—as  a so-called “safe area.”188 
In Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that 
the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of the municipalities of 
the  Autonomous Region  of Krajina  (“ARK”) constituted a sub- 
stantial part of the Bosnian  Muslim and Bosnian  Croat groups  in 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina (“BiH”).189    There, “the  targeted parts 
of the  groups  were the  Bosnian  Muslims and  Bosnian  Croats  of 
the   ARK” and   “there   were  2,162,426   Bosnian   Muslims  and 
795,745 Bosnian  Croats in BiH” according to a 1991 census, and 
there were “233,128 Bosnian Muslims and 63,314 Bosnian Croats 
liv[ing]  in  the  relevant  . . . municipalities.”190    The  Court  con- 
cluded  that “the Bosnian  Muslims and Bosnian  Croats of the . . . 
municipalities of the ARK . . . constituted a substantial  part, both 
intrinsically  and  in relation to the  overall  Bosnian  Muslim  and 
 
 
183.  Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 23 
(Apr.  19, 2004). 
184.  Id. ¶ 15. 
185.  See id. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. ¶ 16. 
189.  See  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 967 (Sept.  1, 
2004). 
190.  Id.  Note  that  the  ratios  of those  targeted to the  larger  populations approxi- 
mate  1/10th. 
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Bosnian  Croat  groups  in BiH.”191 
 
2.  Factual  Information Suggesting  the  “In Whole  or In Part” 
Requirement Is Satisfied 
 
Here,  the  factual  information suggests that  the  part  of the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes that was targeted satisfies the “in 
part”  requirement of genocide’s dolus specialis. 
Initially, it is clear that individuals  were targeted due to their 
group  membership, not  as  isolated   individuals.    This  is  illus- 
trated by  the   ethnically   charged  utterances  of  the   attackers, 
which  make  clear  that  members of certain  African  tribes  were 
being  targeted, not  particular individuals.192 
As to the requirement that the part of the group targeted be 
“substantial,” this can be met in two ways. First, one might  argue 
that  the  number targeted (represented by the  number  killed, 
200,000-400,000)193  is substantial.  Using  a purely  numerical in- 
quiry—the starting  point  suggested  by the  ICTY Appeals Cham- 
ber  in  Krstic´194—the  number 200,000-400,000  sounds  “substan- 
tial.”   Moreover,   when  measured as  a  percentage of  the  esti- 
mated     total    Fur,    Masalit    and     Zaghawa    population   of 
approximately six million  that  had  been  in  Darfur,195  the  per- 
centage approximates 1/30th–1/15th, and the latter  percentage 
approximates the  approximately 1/10th  percentage found to 
satisfy the  “in  part”  requirement in  Brd–janin.196    More  impor- 
tantly, the  Krstic´ case explains  that  one  may look at the  “promi- 
nence”  of the  group targeted, and  whether it is “emblematic of 
the  overall  group, or  is essential  to its survival.”197    Here,  huge 
swaths of land  have been  de-populated of their  original  inhabi- 
tants198—most of  the  rural  areas  of  Darfur.   Thus,  certainly  a 
 
191.  Id. 
192.  See infra Part  II.A.2.c. 
193.  See generally  Reeves, supra note  1. 
194.  Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 12 
(Apr.  19, 2004)  (“The  numeric size of the  targeted part  of the  group is the  necessary 
and important starting  point,  though not in all cases the ending point  of the inquiry.”). 
195.  See  ENTRENCHING   IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 2 (estimating Darfur’s  popula- 
tion  at six million); see also HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, supra note  3. 
196.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 967. 
197.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 12 (“Prominence 
within  the  group can  be a useful  consideration.  If a specific part  of the  group is em- 
blematic  of the  overall group, or is essential  to its survival, that  may support a finding 
that  the  part  qualifies  as substantial  within  the  meaning of Article 4.”). 
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prominent part  of the  groups  has been  attacked. Furthermore, 
given  all  the  crimes  in  aggregate and  conditions of  displace- 
ment,  certainly  the  survival of the  groups  (or  at least the  rural 
parts of the groups), has been  most distinctly threatened.  Thus, 
the  attacks certainly  have targeted a very prominent part  of the 
groups.    Additionally,   the  Brd–janin  case  makes  clear  that  the 
targeting can  be  limited  to a geographical zone,199   as has hap- 
pened here,  where  the  displacement is basically limited  to rural 
Darfur. 
An alternative argument (mentioned above)  would be that 
the  conditions of displacement have been  so horrific,  that  those 
displaced are  part  of  the  genocide.  Under that  analysis,  the 
group targeted would include the two and a half million  dis- 
placed200 and the 200,000-400,000 killed, or nearly three million 
(approximating one-half  of the populations). This would clearly 
satisfy both   the   numerosity  and   substantiality   criteria.    Thus, 
there appear to be at least two alternative ways of showing  that 
the  “in whole or in part”  requirement has been  met. 
 
C.  The Requirement of “A National, Ethnical, Racial or 
Religious  Group” 
 
1.  The  Legal Criteria 
 
The  next  requirement of the  dolus specialis  of genocide is 
that  the  intent to  destroy  must  target   one  of  four  protected 
groups—  a national, ethnical, racial or religious  group.201    Thus, 
 
199.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (“[T]he jurisprudence of 
the  Tribunal supports the  approach that  permits  a characterisation of genocide even 
when the specific intent to destroy a group, in part, extends only to a limited  geographi- 
cal area.”);  see also Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 83 (Dec.  14, 
1999). 
200.  See generally  Hoge,  supra note  2. 
201.  As explained by the  ICTY Trial  Chamber in Brd–janin: 
The Genocide Convention and,  correspondingly, Article 4 of the Statute,  pro- 
tects  national,  ethnical, racial  or  religious   groups.    These   groups   are  not 
clearly defined in the Genocide Convention or elsewhere.   The Trial Chamber 
agrees  with the  Krstic´ Trial  Chamber that: 
The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list 
was designed more   to  describe   a  single  phenomenon, roughly   corre- 
sponding to  what was recognised, before  the  second  world  war, as “na- 
tional  minorities,” rather than  to  refer  to  several  distinct  prototypes of 
human groups.   To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups  on 
the basis of scientifically objective criteria  would thus be inconsistent with 
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for  example, destruction of political  groups  is not  covered.202 
Similarly, targeting of the  cultural or sociological  characteristics 
of the  group would not  suffice,203 although, as explained above, 
“attacks on cultural and  religious  property” “may legitimately  be 
considered as evidence  of an intent to physically destroy the 
group.”204 
Case  law states  that  the  group should  be  evaluated on  a 
“case-by-case” basis  using  “objective  and  subjective  criteria.”205 
Perceived  stigmatization of the  group, by either the  perpetrator 
or the victim on the basis of “perceived  national, ethnical, racial 
or religious characteristics” is relevant  to satisfy the subjective cri- 
terion.  As the  ICTY Trial  Chamber in Brd–janin explained: 
 
[T]he relevant  protected group may be identified by means 
of  the   subjective   criterion  of  the   [stigmatization]  of  the 
group, notably  by the  perpetrators of the  crime,  on the  basis 
of its perceived national, ethnical, racial  or religious  charac- 
teristics.   In some  instances,  the  victim may perceive  himself 
 
 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 682; see also Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. 
IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 554 (Aug.  2, 2001)  (“[T]he  Genocide Convention does  not 
protect all types of human groups.   Its application is confined to  national, ethnical, 
racial  or religious  groups.”). 
202.  See  Prosecutor v. Stakic´,  Case No.  IT-97-24-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 22 (Mar. 22, 2006) (“members of [those drafting the definition of genocide] declined 
to include destruction of political  groups  within  the  definition of genocide.”); see also 
Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 69 (Dec. 14, 1999) (“Article 4 of the Statute  . . . 
excludes  members of political  groups.   The  preparatory work of the  [Genocide]  Con- 
vention  demonstrates that  a wish was expressed to limit the  field of application of the 
Convention to protecting ‘stable’ groups  objectively defined and  to which individuals 
belong  regardless of their  own desires.”). 
203.  See Krstic´ ,  Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (“[A]n  en- 
terprise attacking  only the  cultural or sociological  characteristics of a human group in 
order to  annihilate these  elements which  give to  that  group its own identity  distinct 
from  the  rest of the  community would not  fall under the  definition of genocide.”). 
204.  Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580. 
205.  See, e.g., Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (sug- 
gesting the application of both subjective and objective criteria); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, 
Case No.  ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgment, ¶ 484 (Sept.  12, 2006)  (as  to  the  criteria  for 
determining protected groups,  “Trial Chambers have tended to decide  the matter on a 
case-by-case basis, taking  into  consideration both  the  objective  and  subjective  particu- 
lars”); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 667 (Jan.  17, 
2005)  (“The  Trial  Chamber finds  that  the  correct determination of the  relevant  pro- 
tected  group has to be made  on a case-by-case basis, consulting both  objective and sub- 
jective criteria.”); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 684.  (“The  correct deter- 
mination of the  relevant  protected group has to be made  on  a case-by-case basis, con- 
sulting  both  objective  and  subjective  criteria.”). 
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or herself  to belong  to the  aforesaid  group.206 
However, the  ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified  that  “a subjective 
definition alone  is not  enough to determine victim groups.”207 
There are  ICTY Trial  Chamber decisions  suggesting  that 
“where  more  than  one  group is targeted, the  elements of the 
crime of genocide must be considered in relation to each group 
separately.”208   However, the Appeals Chamber more  recently 
clarified  that  while “each  individual  group which makes  up  the 
aggregate group”  must be “a positively defined target  group,”  af- 
ter  that,  “more  than  one  protected group may be  aggregated 
into  a larger  ‘negative’ group [e.g.,  non-Arabs] for the purposes 
of protection under the  [genocide statute].”209 
An  ethnic   group typically  has  been   defined “as a  group 
whose members share  a common language or culture,”210  al- 
though those  criteria  are  not  always applied strictly.211 
 
206.  As explained in Brd–janin: 
Although the  objective  determination of a religious  group still remains  possi- 
ble . . . it is more  appropriate to evaluate  the  status of a national, ethnical or 
racial  group from  the  point  of view of those  persons  who wish to single  that 
group out  from  the  rest of the  community.  The  Trial Chamber . . . elects to 
evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective 
criterion.  It is the  stigmatisation of a group as a distinct  national, ethnical or 
racial  unit  by the  community which  allows it  to  be  determined  whether a 
targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes 
of the  alleged  perpetrators. 
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 683; see also Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, ¶ 70. 
207.  See Stakic´ ,  Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25. 
208.  Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 686; see also Stakic´ ,  Case No. IT-97- 
24-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (“[A]  targeted group may be distinguishable on more  than  one 
basis and the elements of genocide must be considered in relation to each group sepa- 
rately, e.g. Bosnian  Muslims and  Bosnian  Croats.”). 
209.  Stakic´ , Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 27.  The  Appeals 
Chamber held  that  the  Trial Chamber “did not  err  in concluding that  the  elements of 
genocide must  be  separately  considered in relation to Bosnian  Muslims and  Bosnian 
Croats.” Id. ¶ 28.  In that case, “there  was insufficient evidence  to show that the Bosnian 
Croats  were a targeted group.”  Id. ¶ 29.  Here,  by contrast, if one  were to look at the 
targeting of Fur,  Masalit and  Zaghawa  separately,  it is clear  that  each  group is being 
targeted. 
210.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu,  Case  No.  ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 513  (Sept.   2, 
1998). 
211.  See Schabas, supra note  4, at 1713 (“Whether the Tutsi were in fact ethnically 
distinct  from  the  Hutu,  in an objective  sense, is a question that  has been  set aside be- 
cause the  racist extremists  who perpetrated the  genocide saw them  as being  ethnically 
distinct.”);  see also Luban,  supra note  4, at 318 (“The  evolving case law has moved from 
defining ethnicity  by objective  characteristics such  as shared  language and  culture to 
subjective  self-identification (we Tutsis are  an ethnic  group if we think  of ourselves  as 
one)—and, crucially, to identification as an ethnic  group by others,  namely  the  perse- 
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2.  Factual  Information Suggesting  the  Targeting  of 
Ethnic  Groups 
 
Here,  the  facts suggest  that  the  Fur,  Masalit and  Zaghawa 
(as well as other smaller African tribes under attack)  are “ethnic” 
groups  that  are distinct  from the Arab Janjaweed  attackers.   The 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa each have a distinct  language and cul- 
ture.212 
Members of these groups also self-identified themselves as 
distinct  from  the  Janjaweed  attackers.213   For example, a twenty- 
seven-year-old  farmer  called  Feisal, when  asked  how  he  recog- 
nized the Janjaweed stated:  “It is their  color, their  language and 
their  clothes.   They are not as we are.”214   Similarly, a man  inter- 
viewed said:   “They  killed  everything  black—guns  or  no  guns, 
cattle or no cattle.  This is the program: they don’t  want African 
tribes   in   this   place.”215      Adam,   a  thirty-two-year-old   farmer 
burned out  of  Gokar  village  near   Geneina, said  a  Janjaweed 
leader  in Geneina, Omda  Saef, told local people:   “This place  is 
for Arabs, not  Africans.”216    As mentioned above,  numerous at- 
 
 
cutors.”);  Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 1117, 1119, 1121-22 (“whether or not there is an 
‘objective’ distinction between  victim and  perpetrator groups  in Darfur  is increasingly 
irrelevant from the perspective of” international criminal  law; the Hutu  and Tutsi speak 
the same language, share the same culture and religion, live in the same places, and are 
in  no  sense  tribes  or  distinct  ethnic   groups,  yet ICTR  case  law has  concluded  they 
should  be considered as separate ethnic  groups  because  they perceived themselves  as 
such  (citing  testimony  of Alison DesForges  of Human Rights Watch)). 
212.  Human Rights  Watch  describes  the  targeted communities as “sharing  the 
ethnicity of or geographic proximity  to the  two main  rebel  movements.”  ENTRENCHING 
IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 6-7 (emphasis added).  There are  apparently “many differ- 
ent  ethnic  groups  in Darfur  with their  own languages and  customs”—the three main 
ethnic  groups  being  the  Fur,  Zaghawa  and  Masalit, all of which  are  considered non- 
Arab. See generally  HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, supra note  3. 
213.  Indeed, on  this basis, the  U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry  concluded that  this 
element of genocide was present—there was a “protected group being  targeted.” Com- 
mission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 640.  It found:   “Recent  developments have led mem- 
bers of African and Arab tribes to perceive  themselves  and others  as two distinct  ethnic 
groups.  . . .  The tribes in Darfur  supporting rebels have increasingly  come to be identi- 
fied as ‘African’ and  those  supporting the  Government as ‘Arabs.’ ” Id.   The  Commis- 
sion did not reach  the nuance that there are in fact at least three African ethnic  groups 
being  targeted. 
214.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 36. 
215.  Id. at 27 (citing  a Human Rights Watch interview  with Mohammed in Chad 
on  Apr. 13, 2004). 
216.  Id.  at  42  (emphasis added)  (citing   a  Human Rights  Watch  interview  with 
Adam in Chad  on  Apr. 2, 2004). 
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tackers  have  referred to  those  being  attacked  as “Nuba”217—a 
derogatory term  used  to refer  to ethnic  Africans.218 
Although  an   over-simplification,219     the   conflict    largely 
breaks   down   along   Arab   and   non-Arab   lines.    The   African 
groups  (called  “Zurga”) are defined by the facts that they do not 
speak  Arabic as their  native language and  that  they are  farmers 
(with  the  exception of the  Zaghawa, who are  nomadic).220    Ac- 
cordingly,  the  Fur,  Masalit and  Zaghawa  appear to  be  distinct 
“ethnic  groups”  when  compared to  their  Janjaweed  attackers, 
and, in large part, are distinct from the Government of Sudan.221 
 
D.  The Requirement of “As Such” 
 
1.  The  Legal Criteria 
 
The  final legal requirement regarding the  dolus specialis of 
the  crime  of genocide is that  the  national, ethnical, racial or re- 
ligious group be targeted “as such.”  That is, “[t]he victims of the 
crime must be targeted because  of their  membership in the pro- 
tected  group.”222   As the  Appeals  Chamber in Stakic´ explained: 
“the  words ‘as such’  . . . focus[ ] on  the  destruction of groups, 
 
217.  See supra Part  II.A.2. 
218.  See  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at n.29; see also ENTRENCHED  IMPUNITY, 
supra note  10, at n.35. 
219.  There are members of the Sudanese armed  forces who come from the groups 
under attack.   This is thought to explain  why the  Sudanese Government has in large 
part  used  Janjaweed  forces  as a proxy  to conduct the  attacks,  given the  concern that 
members of the  Sudanese armed  forces who were Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa might  not 
attack fellow group members. See, e.g., ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 9 (not- 
ing that many of the armed  forces were from Darfur  and, for that reason,  the Sudanese 
government utilized  the  Janjaweed  as the  main  ground forces).    In another exception 
to the  rule  that  the  Arabs are attacking  the  African tribes,  Ja’afar Abdul El Hakh,  pro- 
vincial commissioner of Garsila from  2003 through March  2004, who had  a role in the 
March  2004 executions at Garsila and  Deleig, is himself  Fur. See id. at 33.  “There  are 
also many larger Arab tribes in Darfur  who have their  own homelands or dars, and have 
not  participated in the  conflict.”  HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, supra note  3. 
220.  See HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, DARFUR  IN  FLAMES: ATROCITIES  IN  WESTERN SUDAN 
6 (2004),  available at  http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/sudan0404.pdf.  While 
there has  been  destruction that  appears to  be  “religious”  in  form,  because  both  the 
African tribes and Janjaweed are Muslim, this Article does not suggest there is a particu- 
larly religious  motivation to the  attacks.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 28. 
221.  There are also smaller African and Arab ethnic  groups  in Darfur  who are not 
direct  participants in the  conflict.  See  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at n.1.   Thus, 
the  Article does  not  intend to suggest  that  all Arab and  African groups  in Darfur  are 
part  of the  conflict. 
222.  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 669 (Jan. 
17, 2005). 
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not individuals;”223  the words show “that the offence  requires in- 
tent   to  destroy  a  collection of  people who  have  a  particular 
group identity.”224    Thus,  for  example, the  Trial  Chamber in 
Krstic´ explained: 
[T]he victims of genocide must be targeted by reason of their 
membership in a group . . . .  The intent to destroy a group as 
such,  in whole or in part,  presupposes that  the  victims were 
chosen  by reason  of their  membership in the group whose 
destruction was sought.   Mere knowledge of the  victims’ 
membership in a distinct  group on the  part  of the  perpetra- 
tors  is not  sufficient  to establish  an  intention to destroy  the 
group as such.225 
Thus, the group per se must be targeted, not specific individ- 
uals.226   As the  Trial  Chamber in Jelisic´ explained: 
“[T]he intention must  be  to  destroy  the  group ‘as such,’ 
 
223.  Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 24 
(Mar.  22, 2006). 
224.  Id. ¶ 20. 
225.  Prosecutor v. Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 561 (Aug. 2, 2001).  As 
stated  by the  Appeals Chamber in Stakic´: 
The  group must  be targeted because  of characteristics peculiar to it, and  the 
specific intent must  be to destroy  the  group as a separate and  distinct  entity. 
As the  Trial  Chamber in Sikirica pointed out:   “Whereas  it is the  individuals 
that  constitute the  victims of most  crimes,  the  ultimate victim of genocide is 
the  group, although its destruction necessarily  requires the  commission of 
crimes  against   its  members,  that   is,  against   individuals   belonging  to  that 
group.” 
Stakic´ , Case No.  IT-97-24-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, ¶ 521.   Similarly,  the  Trial 
Chamber in Jelisic´ explained: 
The  special  intent which  [characterizes] genocide supposes  that  the  alleged 
perpetrator of the  crime  selects his victims because  they are  part  of a group 
which he is seeking to destroy.  Where the goal of the perpetrator or perpetra- 
tors of the  crime  is to destroy  all or part  of a group, it is the  “membership of 
the  individual  in a particular group rather than  the  identity  of the  individual 
that  is the  decisive  criterion in  determining the  immediate victims  of  the 
crime  of genocide.” 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 67 (Dec.  14, 1999). 
226.  The  trial chamber in Sikirica explained: 
The  evidence  must  establish  that  it is the  group that  has been  targeted, and 
not  merely  specific individuals  within  that  group.  That  is the  significance  of 
the  phrase  “as such” in the  chapeau. Whereas  it is the  individuals  that  consti- 
tute  the  victims of most crimes,  the  ultimate victim of genocide is the  group, 
although its destruction necessarily requires the commission of crimes against 
its members, that  is, against  individuals  belonging to that  group. 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on defense motions  to acquit, 
¶ 89 (Sept.  3, 2001); see also Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 551 (“[G]enocide 
must  target  not  only one  or several individuals  but  a group as such.”). 
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meaning as a  separate and  distinct  entity,  and  not  merely 
some individuals  because  of their  membership in a particular 
group.”    By killing  an  individual   member of  the   targeted 
group, the perpetrator does not thereby  only manifest  his ha- 
tred  of the  group to which his victim belongs  but  also know- 
ingly commits  this act as part  of a wider-ranging intention to 
destroy  the  national, ethnical, racial  or  religious  group  of 
which the  victim is a member.227 
 
2.  Factual  Information Suggesting  “As Such” Is Satisfied 
 
Here,  it is quite  clear  that  the  group members—the Fur, 
Masalit and Zaghawa—are  being targeted because  of their  group 
membership (as  African  tribes), not  as specific  individuals.   As 
victims have stated:   “They killed everything  black . . . they don’t 
want African tribes  in this place.”228   Another witness described 
the motives of the attackers:  “All this is because  we are black.”229 
Accordingly,  it appears clear that  all four elements of geno- 
cide’s dolus specialis have been  met  in the  situation of Darfur. 
 
E.  Examination of Potential Weaknesses as to “Intent to Destroy” 
 
While so much  factual information suggests that there is “in- 
tent   to  destroy”  in  the  situation of  Darfur,   because   credible 
sources have suggested  that the bulk of the killing is not necessa- 
rily genocide,230 it is useful to examine what may be potential 
weaknesses in the  above positions  in order to understand some 
of the  hesitance.  Below, we examine two arguments:  (a)  that 
the  situation is more  prominently about  displacement than  out- 
right  killing,  and  the  extensive  displacement negates  “intent  to 
destroy”;  and  (b)  that  there are  political  or  other motivations 
(such  as obtaining natural resources) for the  killing,  and  these 
other motivations  negate  “intent  to destroy.”  The first argument 
is rebuttable and  the  second   one  is incorrect as  a  matter  of 
 
227.  Jelisic´ , Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 79. 
228.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 27. 
229.  Id. at 30.  For further discussion  of motives, see infra Part  II.E.2. 
230.  It is important to note  that neither Human Rights Watch nor the U.N.’s Com- 
mission  of Inquiry  found that  the  situation was not  genocide.  The  U.N. Commission 
clearly left open  the  possibility that  some acts of genocide might  be occurring when it 
stated  “in some  instances,  individuals,  including Government officials” may have com- 
mitted  “acts with genocidal intent.”  Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 641; see also 
Luban,  supra note  4, at 303-04 (lamenting the news coverage of the Commission’s  find- 
ings, which misstates the  findings  as determining that  no  genocide occurred). 
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law.231 
 
1.  The  Argument That  the  Situation Primarily  Concerns 
Displacement 
 
One  potential argument against  there being  “intent  to de- 
stroy” is that  the  displacement has  been  so extensive  (2.5  mil- 
lion)232   compared to  the  killing  (200,000-400,000)233   that  the 
predominant crime  is displacement, not  killing.234    The  argu- 
ment  would be that the fact that so many were displaced and not 
killed—when more   could  have  been   killed  outright—negates 
“intent  to destroy.”   This argument would  be  bolstered, for ex- 
 
231. Additional  reasons  why the  U.N. Commission of Inquiry  determined that 
genocidal intent was lacking,  at least on  the  part  of the  Government of Sudan,  were: 
(a)  that  young  males  were killed,  not  entire village populations; (b)  because  villages 
containing both  Africans and  Arab tribes  were not  attacked;  (c)  and  because  on  one 
occasion  a person who did  not  resist  having  his camels  stolen  was spared,  while his 
brother who resisted  was killed.  Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶¶ 513, 516, 517. 
These  arguments are  unpersuasive.  First, factually,  not  only young  males  have  been 
killed.  See infra Part II.F.1.  Furthermore, as explained above, the Krstic´ case found that 
the  killing  of military-age  men  was consistent with genocidal intent. See  Prosecutor v. 
Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 26-27 (Apr.  19, 2004); see 
also Mathew, supra note 7, at 540-42 (explaining why the U.N.’s conclusion was inconsis- 
tent  with the  Krstic´ case).   Second,  the  fact that  villages containing both  Africans and 
Arab tribes  were not  attacked  could  in  fact bolster  the  conclusion that  only Africans 
were being  targeted—the attackers  “are hostile  only to the  targeted group, and  don’t 
want to risk damage  to other groups.”   Luban,  supra note  4, at 315.  Third,  the fact that 
a man  who gave up his camels was spared  while his brother, who would not, was killed, 
hardly  negates  genocidal intent.  It might  indicate that  that  camel-thief  lacked  genoci- 
dal intent. Id. at 315.  Moreover,  the  ICTY in the  Jelisic´ case found that  random acts of 
mercy  did  not  negate  genocidal intent. See  Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No.  IT-95-10-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 71 (July 5, 2001); Van Schaack, supra note  7, at 1130-31 
(invoking Jelisic´  to explain  errors  in the  Commission’s  conclusions:  “the  fact that  not 
every potential victim was killed  or  abused  should  not  be a bar  to a finding  of geno- 
cide”);  see  also Luban,  supra note  4, at 315 (criticizing the  Commission’s  conclusion: 
“the  fact that  Adolf Eichmann at one  point  allowed a trainload of Hungarian Jews to 
escape  to safety in return for money  is [no] ‘evidence’  that  the  Holocaust was not  a 
genocide”). 
232.  See supra note  2 and  accompanying text. 
233.  See supra note  1 and  accompanying text. 
234.  The U.N. Commission of Experts  suggested  this argument when it found that 
because  survivors were not killed but forced  into camps, that  negated genocidal intent: 
Another element that tends  to show the Sudanese Government’s lack of geno- 
cidal intent can be seen in the  fact that  persons  forcibly dislodged from  their 
villages are  collected in IDP [Internally Displaced  Persons] camps.   In  other 
words, the  populations surviving attacks on villages are not  killed outright, so 
as to eradicate the group;  they are rather forced  to abandon their  homes  and 
live together in areas  selected  by the  Government. 
Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 515. 
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ample,   by  the  ICTY’s Stakic´ decision,   discussed  above,  which 
found that the killing in a certain  “camp” in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was not  genocide, because  so many  more  individuals  passed  in 
transit   through the   camp   (approximately  27,000)   than   were 
killed  in Prejidor (approximately 3000).235 
The  potential responses to this would be several.  First, one 
should  not extrapolate from the fact that  people were successful 
in  fleeing  that  there was not  originally  intent to  destroy  large 
numbers.  Genocide is largely a crime  of “intent,”  so what hap- 
pens  on  the  ground is less significant  than  actual  intentions.236 
Second,  one might  argue  that the conditions of displacement, as 
discussed  above,  were  so  horrific   that  it  was basically  interna- 
tional  humanitarian assistance  that  kept  large  numbers of Fur, 
Masalit and  Zaghawa alive in camps, not  the  Government of Su- 
dan,  so that  the displacement is part  of the genocide.237   In fact, 
as shown below, the  displacement, in the  situations  that  existed 
in Darfur,  constitutes the  underlying crime  of “inflicting  condi- 
tions  of  life  calculated to  destroy  the  group in  whole  or  in 
part.”238   Third,  one  could  argue  that  based on the  ICTY’s Krstic´ 
 
 
235.  See Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 553 (July 31, 2003), 
aff’d, Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 42 (Mar. 
22, 2006)  (“the  fact that  more  Bosnian  Muslims could  have been  killed, but  were not, 
indicates  that  the  Appellant lacked  dolus specialis.”). 
236.  Stakic´ , Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (“The  key factor  is the  specific 
intent to destroy  the  group rather than  its actual  physical destruction . . . .  It is the 
genocidal dolus specialis that  predominantly constitutes the  crime.”). 
237.  The  Commission of Inquiry  concluded that  “the  living conditions in  those 
camps  . . . do  not  seem  to be  calculated to bring  about  the  extinction of the  ethnic 
group to which the  IDPs belong,”  because  “the Government of Sudan  generally  allows 
humanitarian organizations to help  the  population in camps  by providing food,  clean 
water, medicines and  logistical  assistance.”   Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 515. 
In fact, the  death rate  at the  camps is quite  high,  with mortality  rates similar to famine 
conditions. See Reeves, supra note  6.  There has also been  evidence  of the  Government 
of Sudan  impeding humanitarian assistance.  See  Reeves, supra note  6 (“a  number  of 
camps  have indeed been  extermination sites at some  point  in their  history”);  see also 
infra Part II.F.2.  Reeves notes that conditions in camps vary considerably, but that some 
are  akin  to  “concentration camps,”  such  as the  Kailek camp  south  of Kass in  South 
Darfur.   Eric Reeves, African Auschwitz: The Concentration Camps of Darfur; The UN and the 
International Community Are Acquiescing in  Genocide,  SUDANREEVES.ORG,  May 12,  2004, 
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article191-pl.html.  The   U.N.  suggested   condi- 
tions at Kailek showed “a strategy of systematic and deliberate starvation  being enforced 
by the [Government of Sudan] and its security forces.”  Jim Lobe, Pressure for Intervention 
in Darfur Grows, ONEWORLD  US, June  16, 2004, http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/ 
88343/1/. 
238. See infra Part II.F.3.  Beth Van Schaack, for example, argues that the U.N. 
Commission erred in not  fully appreciating the  deleterious effects of such  conditions: 
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decision,  which found that  transfer of the  women  and  children 
was “an  additional means  by which  to  ensure the  physical  de- 
struction of the Bosnian  Muslim community in Srebrenica,”239 
transfer of part  of the  population has  been  recognized not  to 
negate  genocidal intent.240    Finally, one  could  distinguish Stakic´ 
because  there the  Trial  Chamber looked  at the  3000 deaths  to 
conclude that  the  group was not  targeted in “substantial 
part”241—not to suggest that  the definition of genocide requires 
the  whole group to be killed  (which  it clearly does  not,  since it 
protects groups  “in whole or in part”).   Here,  by contrast, where 
200,000-400,000 have been  killed, the “in part” analysis is far 
stronger.242   Furthermore, in Stakic´ , the Trial Chamber also con- 
cluded  that the accused  “merely intended to displace,  but not to 
destroy, the Bosnian  Muslim group.”243   Here,  by contrast, there 
are very strong  indicators of intent to destroy at least substantial 
parts  of the  protected groups.244 
 
 
 
 
 
[B]y  focusing  only on  how many  individuals  were killed,  as opposed to  the 
number of persons  subjected to other genocidal acts enumerated in the  Con- 
vention,  the Report  [by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry] does not fully appre- 
ciate the range  of genocidal acts encompassed by the Convention and thus 
disregards the notion of non-killing genocide.  The Genocide Convention pur- 
posefully reaches  acts that fall short of murder but that will lead to the destruc- 
tion  of a group. . . .  Implementing such  a policy in Sudan  would enable  the 
government to  blame  any subsequent deaths  on  the  harsh  Sudanese condi- 
tions or external factors such as famine  and deflect attention away from a pro- 
gram  of extermination. 
Van Schaack,  supra note  7, at 1131-32. 
239.  Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 31 
(Apr.  19, 2004).   The  Krstic´  decision  also suggested  that  the  decision  to  displace  the 
women  and  children rather than  killing them  might  have been  explained “by the  Bos- 
nian  Serbs’ sensitivity to public  opinion.” Id.  In other words, the  international outcry 
would have been  far more  strenuous had women and children been  executed. Here,  of 
course,  similar  logic could  be employed:   placing  people in camps  rather than  killing 
them  outright avoids  more  strenuous international condemnation. See  Luban,  supra 
note  4, at 314 (making this argument, and  concluding:  “the similarity with Srebrenica 
is striking,  but  the  ICTY and  the  U.N. Commission reach  opposite conclusions on  re- 
markably  similar evidence”). 
240.  See Mathew, supra note  7, at 542-43. 
241.  Stakic´ ,  Case No.  IT-97-24-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, ¶ 42 (explaining 
Trial  Chamber’s reasoning). 
242.  See supra Part  II.B. 
243.  See Stakic´,  Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 56 (construing 
Trial  Chamber). 
244.  See supra Part  II.A. 
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2.  The  Argument That  There Are Other Motivations  at Issue 
Which  Negate  Intent to Destroy 
 
Another argument that  has been  made  is that  the  attackers 
were not  motivated by intent to destroy  the  groups  per  se, but 
based  on  other reasons.   This appears to be the  key reason  why 
the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry concluded that, at least on the 
part  of the  central  Government, genocidal intent was lacking: 
The  crucial  element of genocidal intent appears to be miss- 
ing, at least as far as the  central  Government authorities are 
concerned. Generally speaking  the policy of attacking, killing 
and  forcibly  displacing   members of  some  tribes  does  not 
evince  a specific  intent to annihilate, in whole  or  in part,  a 
group distinguished on  racial,  ethnic, national or  religious 
grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organ- 
ized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from 
their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.245 
A more  expansive  argument would be, for example, that  the 
Government’s  motivations   were  to  control the   counter-insur- 
gency, punish the  ethnic  groups  from  which the  counter-insur- 
gency sprang, and prevent  a political solution  that would have 
provided the  African tribes  in Darfur  with political  rights.   The 
argument could  be, regarding the  Janjaweed,  that  they, by con- 
trast,  had  no  such  political  motivations,  but  were content to be 
the  proxy-fighting  force  for the  Government of Sudan  because 
they were paid  salaries by the  Government of Sudan,246   receive 
cattle,  and  received  land  and  access to  water  once  the  African 
tribes  were removed. 
The response to these arguments is that they confuse  intent 
and motive.  As explained above, the law is clear that  in examin- 
ing genocidal intent, the  focus is whether there is intent to de- 
stroy, not why there is intent to destroy (or  motive).247   Even the 
 
245.  Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 640 (emphasis added). 
246.  See, e.g., DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note  10, at 1 (Janjaweed were “supplied 
with arms, communications equipment, salaries and uniforms by government officials”) 
(emphasis added). 
247.  The Appeals Chamber in Jelisic´ noted the “irrelevance”  of motives in criminal 
law and  highlighted: 
[T]he necessity to distinguish specific intent from  motive.  The  personal mo- 
tive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain 
personal economic benefits,  or  political  advantage or  some  form  of power. 
The  existence  of a personal motive  does  not  preclude the  perpetrator from 
also having  the  specific intent to commit  genocide. 
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U.N.   Commission  recognized   this   distinction.248      Both   the 
ICTR’s Media decision249 and the Iraqi High  Tribunal’s Anfal de- 
cision250 apply just that distinction, explaining that a political 
motivation (of the Hutu  and then-Iraqi regime,  respectively)  did 
not negate  genocidal intent (in targeting the Tutsi and Kurds of 
Northern Iraq,  respectively). 
Thus,  in the  ICTR’s Media decision,  the  Trial  Chamber ex- 
plained that  the  fact that  the  Hutu  had  a “political  agenda”  did 
not  negate  genocidal intent: 
Based on the evidence  set forth  above, the Chamber finds be- 
yond  a  reasonable doubt  that  Ferdinand  Nahimana,  Jean- 
Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze acted with intent to de- 
stroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic  group. The Chamber 
considers that the association of the Tutsi ethnic group with a politi- 
cal agenda, effectively merging ethnic and political identity, does not 
negate the genocidal animus that motivated the Accused.  To  the 
contrary,  the  identification of Tutsi individuals  as enemies  of 
the  state associated  with political  opposition, simply by virtue 
of their  Tutsi ethnicity,  underscores the  fact that  their  mem- 
bership in  the  ethnic  group, as such,  was the  sole  basis on 
which they were targeted.251 
 
A similar conclusion was recently  reached by the  Trial 
Chamber judges of the  Iraqi  High  Tribunal (a national tribunal 
sitting in Baghdad) in concluding that  genocide had  been  com- 
mitted  against the Iraqi Kurds when they were subjected in 1988 
to  chemical   weapons  attacks  and  other crimes  as part  of  the 
“Anfal campaign” under Saddam  Hussein’s regime.252   The Trial 
 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No.  IT-95-10-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 5, 
2001); see also Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 
(Mar.  22, 2006)  (“[T]he  Tribunal’s jurisprudence distinguishes between  motive  and 
intent; in  genocide cases,  the  reason   why the  accused  sought  to  destroy  the  victim 
group has no  bearing on  guilt.”). 
248.  See Commission  of Inquiry, supra note  7, ¶ 493 (“From  the viewpoint of criminal 
law, what matters  is not the motive, but rather whether or not there exists the requisite 
special intent to destroy  a group.”). 
249.  Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judg- 
ment  and  Sentence, ¶ 969 (Dec.  3, 2003). 
250.  Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/C Second  2006, Iraqi High Tribu- 
nal (English Translation) (June  24, 2007). 
251.  Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and  Sentence, ¶ 969 (emphasis 
added); see also Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (Dec. 13, 
2005)  (“The  perpetrator need  not  be solely motivated by a criminal  intent to commit 
genocide.”). 
252.  As part  of the  “Anfal campaign,” the  Tribunal found that  more  than  3000 
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Chamber stated:   “It is important to  mention that  the  relation 
between  ethnic  group and  political  program, which  practically 
merge  between  ethnic  and political  identifies,  does not [negate] 
the  intention of genocide . . . .”253   In other words, where  a pro- 
tected  ethnic  group was being  targeted (the  Kurds of Northern 
Iraq), the  fact that  there was also a political  motivation for the 
targeting did  not  negate  “intent  to destroy.”254 
That  this is the  correct legal result  is reinforced by examin- 
ing additional cases where courts  found that genocide occurred, 
but  there were clearly varying motives.  For example, in the  for- 
mer Yugoslavia, some of the killing—such  as the Srebrenica mas- 
sacre—has  been  held by the ICTY to constitute genocide.255   Yet, 
if one  examines the  motivations  at issue, it is clear that  the  Bos- 
nian-Serb  political  and  military  leadership did  not  target  Bos- 
nian-Muslims out of some “purety” of ethnic  hatred, but because 
they wanted  to control the  land  that  Srebrenica was on, thereby 
connecting two land  areas  under Republic  Srpska  control, and 
strengthening Serb  power  (all  political   motivations).256     Simi- 
 
 
villages were destroyed and  that  there were at least “tens of thousands of victims,” with 
some fatality estimates  as high as 182,000.  Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/ 
C Second  2006, at 501. 
253.  Anfal Trial  Chamber Judgment, Case No.  1/C Second  2006,  at 629 (citing 
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and  Sentence, ¶ 969). 
254.  The  Tribunal concluded that   the  Kurds  “were  targeted by  [the]  former 
[Ba’ath] regime  and  Saddam  Hussein  for their  ethnicity  and  nationalism.”  Anfal Trial 
Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/C Second  2006, at 630, 634. 
255.  See  Prosecutor v. Krstic´,  Case  No.  IT-98-33-A, Appeals  Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 95-97 (Apr.  19, 2004). 
256.  As the  ICTY Appeals Chamber explained in Krstic´: 
Srebrenica (and the  surrounding Central  Podrinje region) were of immense 
strategic  importance to the Bosnian  Serb leadership. Without  Srebrenica, the 
ethnically  Serb state of Republica Srpska they sought  to create  would remain 
divided  into  two disconnected parts,  and  its access to Serbia proper would be 
disrupted. The capture and ethnic  purification of Srebrenica would therefore 
severely undermine the  military efforts of the  Bosnian  Muslim state to ensure 
its viability, a consequence the  Muslim leadership fully realized  and  strove to 
prevent. Control over the Srebrenica region  was consequently essential to the 
goal of some  Bosnian  Serb leaders  of forming  a viable political  entity  in Bos- 
nia. 
Id. ¶ 15.  Proving the U.N. impotent to protect its “safe area” and the Bosnian  Muslims 
may also have been  a motivation.  As the  Appeals Chamber further explained: 
In  addition, Srebrenica was important due  to  its prominence in  the  eyes of 
both the Bosnian Muslims and the international community. The town of 
Srebrenica was the  most visible of the  “safe areas” established by the  U.N. Se- 
curity Council  in Bosnia.  By 1995 it had  received  significant  attention in the 
international media.   In  its resolution declaring Srebrenica a safe area,  the 
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larly, the  killing in Rwanda has been  deemed genocide in many 
decisions of the ICTR.  There again, there may have been  a great 
amount of ethnic  hatred per  se, but the killing was largely moti- 
vated by a Hutu  grab to consolidate political  power and  win the 
ongoing war against  the  Tutsi.257    Yet, these  underlying  motiva- 
tions  are  never  suggested  to negate  genocidal intent.  Similarly, 
if the  Genocide Convention had  existed  at  the  time  of World 
War II,258 we would not inquire why the Nazi Government deter- 
mined  to exterminate the Jewish people of Germany  and the oc- 
cupied  territories (their political  motivations); rather, the  fact 
that  they set out  to exterminate a substantial  part  of the  Jewish 
people  would  suffice  to  constitute  genocide.  Accordingly,   it 
does  not  matter that  the  Government of Sudan  may have  had 
political  and/or military motivations  in launching its campaign 
against  the  Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa—the law is clear, such 
motivations  do not negate  genocidal intent.259 
Thus,  the  two most  serious  potential arguments as to  why 
 
 
Security Council  announced that  it “should  be free from  armed  attack  or any 
other hostile  act.”  This guarantee of protection was re-affirmed by the  com- 
mander of the  U.N.  Protection Force  in  Bosnia  (“UNPROFOR”) and  rein- 
forced  with the  deployment of U.N. troops.   The  elimination of the  Muslim 
population of Srebrenica, despite  the assurances  given by the international 
community, would serve as a potent example to all Bosnian  Muslims of their 
vulnerability  and  defenselessness in the  face of Serb military forces. 
Id. ¶ 16; see also SAMANTHA  POWER, A PROBLEM FROM  HELL:  AMERICA  AND THE  AGE   OF 
GENOCIDE 248-49 (2002)  (explaining that  the  violence  against  Croats  and  Muslims was 
motivated by a desire  to establish  Republika Srpska). 
257.  ALISON  DES  FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE  STORY:   GENOCIDE  IN RWANDA 2 
(1999)  (“The  [Hutu] believed  that  the extermination campaign would restore  the soli- 
darity of the Hutu  under their  leadership and help  them  win the war [against  the Tutsi 
armed  forces—the Rwandan Patriotic  Front], or at least improve  their  chances  of nego- 
tiating  a favorable  peace.”). 
258.  The  Genocide Convention dates  from  1948 and  its creation is largely a re- 
sponse  to the  Holocaust. Genocide Convention, supra note  12. 
259.  See Reeves, supra note  7 (arguing that  the U.N. Commission confused motive 
and intent in a “fundamental” “intellectual failing” which “vitiate[s]  any conclusion de- 
riving from  this line  of reasoning”).  As another author has  explained, it would  be  a 
mistake  to characterize the  conflict  in Darfur  as one  not  about  ethnic  conflict  but  re- 
sources,  even though the  Janjaweed  may have been  motivated by the  ability to gain: 
[L]oot and  access . . . [to] fertile  land  and  water resources. . . .  In  interna- 
tional  law, however,  motive  is distinguishable from  intent.  Even though the 
perpetrators may have been  motivated by economic gain, that motive does not 
necessarily  negate   the   simultaneous  existence   of  genocidal intent.   A  ge- 
nocidist  may possess both  financial  motive and  the  requisite intent for geno- 
cide. 
Mathew, supra note  7, at 539. 
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genocidal intent might  be lacking are either rebuttable or incor- 
rect  as a matter of law. 
 
F. The Underlying  Crimes 
 
Finally, as mentioned above, in addition to the dolus specialis 
or  special  intent for  genocide, it is necessary  to  show  one  or 
more  of the  following underlying crimes: 
(a)       Killing members of the  group; 
(b)       Causing  serious  bodily or mental  harm  to members of 
the  group; 
(c)       Deliberately  inflicting  on  the  group conditions of life 
calculated to bring  about  its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
(d)        Imposing measures  intended to prevent  births  within 
the  group; 
(e)       Forcibly transferring children of the  group to another 
group.260 
Here,  the  facts clearly show that  at least  the  first three crimes 
have been  committed.261 
 
1.  Killing Members  of the  Group 
 
For “killing”262  to suffice as an underlying crime,  it must be 
killing of members of the protected group.263   Whereas the focus 
of the  dolus specialis is the  intention to commit  genocide,264   re- 
garding the underlying crimes, “proof  of a result” is required.265 
The mens rea for killing requires intent, but not necessarily pre- 
 
 
260.  See Rome  Statute  of the  International Criminal  Court,  supra note  40, art. 6. 
261.  Indeed, the  U.N.  Commission of Inquiry  also reached this  conclusion that 
“the actus reus consisting  of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental  harm,  or deliber- 
ately inflicting  conditions of life likely [sic]  to bring  about  physical destruction,” had 
occurred. Commission of Inquiry, supra note  7, at ¶ 640. 
262.  See  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´  & Jokic´, Case No.  IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 642 
(Jan.  17, 2005)  (“In  the  jurisprudence of the  Tribunal, the  term  ‘killings’ referred to 
under Article 4(2)(a) has been  equated with murder.”). 
263.  See  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 689 (Sept.  1, 
2004)  (“The  killing  must  be  of members of the  targeted national, ethnical, racial  or 
religious  group.”). 
264.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (July 31, 
2004)  (“The  key factor  is the  specific intent to destroy the  group rather than  its actual 
physical destruction.”). 
265.  Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (“The  acts in subparagraphs 
(a)  and  (b)  of Article 4(2)  require proof  of a result.”). 
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meditation.266 
Here,  the  facts suggest  there has  been  extensive  killing  of 
members of the  Fur, Masalit and  Zaghawa tribes: 
• There are  numerous accounts of bombardment of villages 
of the  Fur,  Masalit and  Zaghawa African  tribes  by the  Suda- 
nese  Air Force.267 
• Subsequent to  bombardment, the  Janjaweed  move  in  on 
horseback, followed by the army in cars, and start killing.  For 
example, in the  words of one  witness: 
“The  army  was in  Land  Cruisers  and  the  Janjaweed  on 
horses  and  camels  . . . .  The  Janjaweed  entered the  vil- 
lage first, followed by the cars.  They were shooting indis- 
criminately.   They went into  tukls [huts] and  killed  peo- 
ple who were hiding  under their  beds.”268 
The following killings—which are believed to be typical of a 
broader pattern—were documented: 
• Mororo   village,  close  to  the  Masalit-Fur  border:   40 
dead;269 
• The  Murnei  area,  twelve villages:  82 dead;270 
• Mango,    in   the    Terbeba-Arara   area:  at   least   20 
killed;271 
• Urum,  near  Habila:   112 killed  in two attacks;272 
• The  Bareh  area,  east of Geneina:  111 killed;273 
• Habila    Canare,   twenty-five  kilometers   east   of   El 
Geneina:  50 killed;274 
• Kondoli,  in the  Misterei  area:   24 killed;275 
• Nouri,  near  Murnei:   136 killed;276 
 
266.  Stakic´ , Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 515 (“As regards  the underlying acts, 
the word ‘killing’ is understood to refer to intentional but not necessarily premeditated 
acts.”). 
267.  See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 24-25 (discussing aerial bombardment 
of civilians). 
268.  Id. at 16 (quoting a Human Rights Watch  interview  with Feisal in Chad  on 
Apr. 5, 2004). 
269.  Id. at 9. 
270.  Id. at 10. 
271.  Id. at 11. 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id. at 12. 
274.  Id. at 13. 
275.  Id. at 14. 
276.  Id. at 15. 
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• Kenyu, near  Forbranga:  57 killed;277 
• Sildi, south-east  of Geneina:  12 killed;278 
• Tunfuka, south  of Murnei:   26 killed;279 
• Tullus:  at least 27 killed;280 
• Terbeba: 26 killed;281 
•  Millebeeda village and area, south-west of Geneina:  59 
civilians killed.282 
• There are  instances  of mass executions by the  Janjaweed, 
such  as at Wadi Salih, where  several hundred men  were exe- 
cuted  over a few days in early March  2004.283   According  to 
testimony  taken  in Chad: 
A survivor of one  of the  mass killings, a farmer  who was 
shot  in  the  back  rather than  the  neck,  told  a neighbor 
that  the  arrested men  were  taken,  in  army  trucks  and 
cars, to a valley a few miles south  of Deleig.  “Then  they 
lined  us up, made  us kneel  down and  bend  our  heads— 
and shot us from behind,” he told a neighbor. “I was left 
for dead  . . . .”  The executioners were army soldiers and 
Janjaweed,  operating together.284 
• Children and  elderly  are among  those  killed285  (making it 
 
277.  Id. at 16. 
278.  Id. at 17. 
279.  Id. at 18. 
280.  Id. 
281.  Id. at 20. 
282.  Id.  at  21; see  also id.  at  Appendix D (massacre and  mass killing  victims, by 
village). 
283.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 26-28. 
284.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at  22 (citing  Human Rights  Interview  in 
Chad  on  Apr.  14, 2004).   Ja’afar Abdul  El Hakh,  provincial  commissioner of Garsila 
from  2003  through March  2004,  appears to  have  had  a direct  role  in  planning and 
coordinating March 2004 mass executions in Deleig and Garsila, and distributing weap- 
ons to the  Janjaweed.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 28-33.  He was later 
promoted to governor of West Darfur.  Id. at 55. 
285.  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 12 (three-year-old orphaned grandson of 
an imam killed);  id. at 13 (a one  hundred-year-old man,  Barra Younis, from  Terchana, 
was “burned . . . alive in his hut”);  id. (helicopter pilot killed a woman–-seventy-year-old 
Mariam Abdul Qadar–-in  the Bareh  area, east of Geneina); id. at 17 (as to Kenyu, near 
Fobranga:  “So many children were killed”);  id. at 24 (child and  old woman burned to 
death in her  house  in Kundung by the  Janjaweed);  id. at 31 (seven  year old  killed  in 
Kudumule, outside  Misterei);  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 51 (An elderly 
Zaghawa woman  who lived in Marla said:  “Many people and  children were killed dur- 
ing that attack [on  Marla, December 15-16, 2004] and in front  of us, but we had to leave 
their  bodies  unburied and  run.”) (quoting Human Rights Watch interview  with Inter- 
nally  displaced person from  Marla,  February  2005);  id.  (children were  killed,  some 
while fleeing  the  school  in Hamada, January  13-14, 2005). 
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clear  that  not  solely military-age men  have been  targeted, al- 
though men have probably  been  the predominant targets);286 
• There are  also instances  where  severely ill or wounded vil- 
lagers  were denied access to larger  towns with hospitals  and 
health care.287   For example, a witness from a village approxi- 
mately  fifteen  km from  Garsila  said his child  “died  after  he 
was forced  to wait six days for a Janjaweed  escort  before  tak- 
ing the child to a health center in Garsila.”288   Wounded and 
villagers were also detained in  Adway without  being  able  to 
seek  medical  care  after  men  were  summarily  executed and 
women  raped by government soldiers  and  Janjaweed.289 
Thus,  it seems quite  clear  that  the  crime  of intentionally killing 
protected group members has occurred. 
 
2.  Causing  Serious  Bodily or Mental  Harm  to 
Members  of the  Group 
 
As to  the  underlying crime  of  causing  serious  bodily  or 
mental  harm  to members of the group, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
in Krstic´ explained that  the  “actus  reus  is an  intentional act or 
omission  causing  serious  bodily  or  mental   suffering.”290    “The 
[ICTR]  Trial Chamber in the Kayishema & Ruzindana case found 
that bodily harm refers to harm that seriously injures the health, 
causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, 
internal organs  or senses.”291 
Case law specifies that “the harm  need  not be permanent or 
irremediable, but  ‘[i]t  must be harm  that  results  in a grave and 
long-term disadvantage to a person’s  ability to lead a normal and 
constructive life.’ ”292      Put  another way, “[t]he harm   inflicted 
need  not  be permanent and  irremediable, but  needs  to be seri- 
ous.”293   Mental harm  thus “refers to more  than  minor or tempo- 
rary impairment of mental  faculties.”294   Whether an act consti- 
 
286.  For instance, at Wadi Salih, the  men  were purposefully singled  out  and  exe- 
cuted.  See  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 21-23.  This also occured in the  valley 
south  of Deleig.  Id. at 22. 
287.  Id. at 35. 
288.  Id. at 39 (citing  Human Rights Watch interview  in Darfur  on  Apr. 2004). 
289.  See generally  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10. 
290.  Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
291.  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan.  7, 2005). 
292.  Id. 
293.  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 690 (Sept.  1, 2004); 
see also Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 516 (July 31, 2003). 
294.  Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (invoking the  Semanza Trial 
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tutes  “serious bodily or mental  harm  . . . must  be assessed on  a 
case-by-case basis,  with  due  regard for  the  particular  circum- 
stances  of the  case.”295 
Acts that  have been  recognized to constitute “serious bodily 
or mental  harm”  include:   torture, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment,  sexual  violence  including rape,  interrogations combined 
with beatings,  threats  of death, deportation,296  and  “harm  that 
damages   health or  causes  disfigurement or  serious  injury.”297 
The ICTR has recognized the refusal to allow refugees  to obtain 
food as causing  “serious bodily or mental  harm.”298   As with kill- 
ing, proof  of a result is required—the act must occur,  not just be 
intended.299    As to  the  mens  rea,  “the  harm  must  be  inflicted 
intentionally.”300 
Thus,  for example, trauma and  wounds  suffered  by individ- 
uals  who  survived  the  Srebrenica mass  executions constituted 
“serious bodily and mental  harm.”301   An ICTY Trial Chamber in 
 
Judgment decision); see  also Krstic´, Case No.  IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (“[S]erious 
harm  need  not cause permanent and irremediable harm,  but it must involve harm  that 
goes beyond  temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation.  It must be harm 
that  results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s  ability to lead a normal 
and  constructive life.”). 
295.  Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 646. 
296.  Id. (listing  “torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence includ- 
ing rape,  interrogations combined with beatings,  threats  of death, and  deportation”); 
Krstic´ , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (listing “inhuman treatment, torture, rape, 
sexual  abuse  and  deportation are  among  the  acts which  may cause  serious  bodily  or 
mental  injury”).   The  Trial  Chamber in Blagojevic´ recognized that  deportation was in- 
cluded: 
In  particular, the  Krstic´  Trial  Chamber held  that  “inhuman treatment [.  . .] 
and deportation are among  the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental 
injury.”  It found support for this in the  case law of this Tribunal as well as in 
other sources.   The  Eichmann Judgement rendered by the  Jerusalem  District 
Court  on  12 December 1961 had  already  included “deportation” among  the 
acts that  could  constitute serious  bodily or mental  harm. 
Blagojevic´ Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 646. 
297.  See  Brd–janin,  Case  No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 690  (listing  “torture, inhu- 
mane  or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape,  interrogations combined 
with beatings,  threats  of death, and  harm  that  damages  health or causes disfigurement 
or  serious  injury  to  members of  the  targeted national, ethnical, racial  or  religious 
group”); see also Stakic´ , Case No IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 516. 
298.  See Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶ 330 (Dec. 
13, 2006). 
299.  See  Brd–janin, Case  No.  IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 688  (“The  acts  in  subpara- 
graphs  (a)  and  (b)  of Article 4(2)  require proof  of a result.”). 
300.  Blagojevic´ , Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645; Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36- 
T, Judgment, ¶ 690. 
301.  See Blagojevic´ ,  Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 647-49. 
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Blagojevic´ &  Jokic´  explained:  “The  fear  of being  captured, and, 
at the  moment of the  separation, the  sense of utter  helplessness 
and extreme fear for their  family and friends’ safety as well as for 
their  own safety, is a traumatic experience from  which one  will 
not quickly–-if ever-–recover.”302   The forced  displacement of 
women,  children and  elderly  from  Srebrenica was held  to be a 
“traumatic experience” which caused  “serious  mental  harm.”303 
The Trial Chamber also considered, inter  alia, that there was not 
“adequate supplies  of food, medicine or even water for the 
thousands of Bosnian  Muslims” displaced.304 
Here,  there are numerous crimes  that  would constitute “se- 
rious  bodily or mental  harm”: 
 
• Torture:  “Government forces  . . . regularly  arbitrarily  de- 
tained  and sometimes  tortured Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit stu- 
dents,  political  activists, and  other individuals  in Darfur  and 
Khartoum.”305   In one case of torture reported from the Gar- 
sila area,  a Fur  man  was detained and  whipped until  all the 
skin was flayed from  his back; holes were then  gouged  out of 
 
 
302.  Id. ¶ 647.  The  Trial  Chamber continued: 
The Trial Chamber finds that the men  suffered  mental  harm  having their 
identification documents taken away from them,  seeing that they would not be 
exchanged as previously told,  and  when  they understood what their  ultimate 
fate was. Upon  arrival at an execution site, they saw the  killing fields covered 
of bodies  of the  Bosnian  Muslim  men  brought to  the  execution site before 
them  and  murdered.  After having  witnessed  the  executions of relatives  and 
friends,  and in some cases suffering  from injuries themselves, they suffered  the 
further mental  anguish  of lying still, in fear, under the  bodies—sometimes of 
relative  or friends—for long hours,  listening  to the  sounds  of the  executions, 
of the  moans  of those  suffering  in  pain,  and  then  of the  machines as mass 
graves were dug. 
Id. ¶ 647. 
303.  See id. ¶¶ 650, 652-54.  For example, the  Trial  Chamber held  that: 
The  Trial  Chamber has no  doubt that  the  suffering  of the  women,  children 
and  elderly  people who were cruelly  separated from  their  loved and  forcibly 
transferred, and  the  terrible consequences that  this had  on their  life, reaches 
the  threshold of serious  mental  harm  under Article  4(2)(b) of the  Statute. 
The  Trial Chamber also finds that  the level of mental  anguish  suffered  by the 
women,  children and  elderly  people who were forcibly displaced from  their 
homes—in such  a manner as to  [traumatize] them  and  prevent  them  from 
ever  returning—obliged to  abandon their  property and  their  belongings as 
well as their  traditions and  more  in general their  relationship with the  terri- 
tory they were living on,  does  constitute serious  mental  harm. 
Id. ¶ 652. 
304.  Id. ¶ 650. 
305.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 7. 
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his  flesh.306    In  another case,  a  forty-two-year old  Zaghawa 
man  reported that:   “They hung  me with hooks  piercing my 
chest.   They also burned me . . . .  They tied us [himself  and 
about  thirty  other men] together and  interrogated us about 
animals . . . .  [They] shot and slaughtered some of [the  men] 
in front  of my eyes.”307   In a further case, a one hundred-year- 
old man,  Barra Younis, from Terchana, was “burned . . . alive 
in his hut.”308   A child and  old woman were burned to death 
in her  house  in Kundung by the Janjaweed.309   A seventy-five- 
year old trader from  Arwalla was mutilated by the  Janjaweed, 
who cut the  skin on top of his head  and  ears then  threw him 
into a fire and left him for dead.310   Torture has continued in 
camps  controlled by the  Janjaweed.311 
• Rape: As detailed above, there are numerous eye-witness ac- 
counts  of rape.312 
• Individuals being buried alive: There are  reports of men  be- 
ing buried alive around Garsila and  Deleig by Janjaweed.313 
• Detentions: At Wadi Saleh, men  were detained by police  or 
military  personnel, then   transferred to  trucks  and  military 
cars and  transported out  of town  prior  to  execution by the 
 
306.  Id. at 33. 
307.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 18 (quoting Human Rights Watch 
interview  in a refugee  camp  in Chad  on  July 2, 2005). 
308.  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 13 (quoting Human Rights Watch inter- 
view with Adam in Chad  on  April 8, 2004). 
309.  Id. at 24 (citing  Human Rights Watch interview  in Darfur  in April 2004). 
310.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 28 (quoting Human Rights Watch 
interview  in a refugee  camp  in Chad  on  June  27, 2005). 
311.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 42. 
312.  See supra Part II.A.2.f.  The ICTR has suggested  that rape might also constitute 
the  underlying crime  of inflicting  “measures  intended to  prevent  births,”  another  of 
genocide’s underlying crimes: 
In  patriarchal societies,  where  membership of a group is determined by the 
identity  of the  father,  an  example of a measure intended to  prevent  births 
within the group is the case where, during rape,  a woman of the said group is 
deliberately impregnated by a man  of another group, with the  intent to have 
her  give birth  to  a child  who  will consequently not  belong  to  its mother’s 
group. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept.  2, 1998).   Addi- 
tionally, the rape of large numbers of younger  girls who have suffered  resulting medical 
problems, and  the  scarring  and  branding of women,  as well as the  public  infliction  of 
rape  to which often  renders the women unfit as marriage partners arguably  also consti- 
tute  “measures  intended to prevent  births.”   Interview  with Eric Reeves, supra note  6. 
The  crime  of “forcibly transferring children of the  group to another group”  may also 
have occurred based  on reports of mass abductions of non-Arab/African children.  Id. 
313. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 33 (quoting Human Rights Watch 
interviews in Darfur  in April 2004). 
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Janjaweed and government soldiers.314   As part of the January 
13-14, 2005 attack on Hamada, the residents were detained in 
the  village and  not  allowed  to  flee,  while some  of the  men 
and boys were executed, and some of the women and girls 
raped.315 
• Denial of humanitarian assistance and displacement in conditions 
where  there were inadequate supplies of food, medicine or water for 
thousands of individuals displaced into camps: The  government 
of  Sudan  has  denied humanitarian assistance  to  those  dis- 
placed.   For example, the  U.S. Congress  has found that: 
[T]he Government of Sudan  has restricted access by hu- 
manitarian and human rights workers to the Darfur  area 
through intimidation by military and security forces, and 
through bureaucratic and  administrative obstruction, in 
an attempt to inflict the  most devastating  harm  on those 
individuals  displaced from their  villages and homes  with- 
out  any means  of sustenance or shelter.316 
As clearly  documented in  U.N.  memoranda,317  “[t]he Gov- 
ernment of Sudan  almost  completely banned humanitarian 
agencies  from Darfur  for [at least] four crucial  months, from 
late October 2003 through late-February  2004.”318   As of May 
2006, it was reported that  “[t]he Sudanese government and 
rebel  groups  in Darfur  [were]  hindering humanitarian agen- 
cies from reaching hundreds of thousands of civilians depen- 
dent  on  international aid  in  many  areas  of Darfur;”  at that 
point,   “the  U.N.  estimat[ed] that   at  least  650,000  people 
[were]  partly or wholly inaccessible  to international humani- 
tarian  agencies.”319   As mentioned above,  civilians displaced 
into  camps  are  entirely   dependent on  humanitarian assis- 
 
314.  See ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 26. 
315.  See id. at 55. 
316.  Comprehensive Peace in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(11),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006). 
317.  See Reeves, supra note  7.  As of December 8, 2003, Tom Vraalsen, U.N. special 
envoy for humanitarian affairs in Sudan,  declared in a memo  to the U.N. humanitarian 
coordinator for Sudan  (Mukesh Kapila),  that  “Khartoum was ‘systematically’ denying 
access to areas  in which  non-Arab/African tribal  populations were concentrated. . . . 
While [Khartoum’s] authorities claim unimpeded access, they greatly restrict  access to 
the  areas  under their  control, while imposing  blanket  denial  to all rebel-held areas.” 
Id. (citing  Tom Vraalsen, Note to the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sudan:  Humanita- 
rian Crisis in Darfur, December 8, 2003).   Reeves estimates  that  Khartoum’s deliberate 
impeding of humanitarian deployment and access, which he states occurred over half a 
year, may have cost 100,000 lives. Id. 
318.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 50. 
319.  HUMAN RIGHTS  WATCH, DARFUR:   HUMANITARIAN AID   UNDER  SIEGE  2 (2006), 
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan0506/darfur0506.pdf. 
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tance.320 
• Denial of access to medical treatment: As detailed above, there 
are also instances  where severely ill or wounded villagers were 
denied  access  to  larger   towns  with  hospitals   and   health 
care.321 
• Mental suffering: The infliction  of all of the above and addi- 
tional  crimes  has caused  a great  deal  of mental  suffering  to 
the  people of Darfur—their villages were subjected to aerial 
bombardment,   individuals    were   attacked,   houses    were 
burned, foodstuffs  were looted, cattle  were stolen,  and  indi- 
viduals were subjected to physical assault, torture, sexual vio- 
lence,  detention, being  buried alive, denial  of humanitarian 
assistance,  denial  of access to medical  treatment and  forced 
displacement. 
 
Thus,  it appears clear that  there has been:   (a)  infliction  of 
serious  bodily harm;  (b)  infliction  of serious  mental  harm;  and 
(c)  that  at least some of the harm  was inflicted  intentionally.  As 
to  the  bodily  harm,   there can  be  no  doubt that  it  was “seri- 
ous.”322   Indeed, case law has already acknowledged that torture, 
rape  and displacement—crimes that have all occurred in Dar- 
fur—constitute  “serious  bodily  harm.”323     Additionally,   if  the 
forced  displacement of women,  children and  elderly from 
Srebrenica was held  to cause “serious mental  harm,”324 then  cer- 
tainly forced  displacement accompanied by numerous other 
crimes  has also caused  “serious  mental  harm”  to the  people of 
Darfur. 
 
3.  Deliberately  Inflicting  On  the  Group  Conditions of Life 
Calculated to Bring  About  Its Physical Destruction in 
Whole or in Part 
 
As to the  crime  of deliberately inflicting  on the  group con- 
ditions of life calculated to bring about  its physical destruction in 
 
320.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 58-59. 
321.  See supra Part  II.F.1. 
322.  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan. 
17,  2005)  (defining serious  bodily  harm  as “harm  that  seriously  injures  the  health, 
causes  disfigurement or  causes  any serious  injury  to  the  external, internal organs  or 
senses”). 
323.  See id. ¶ 646 (listing  “torture, inhuman or  degrading treatment, sexual  vio- 
lence  including rape,  interrogations combined with beatings,  threats  of death, and  de- 
portation”). 
324.  See id. ¶ 652. 
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whole  or  in  part,  the  group targeted must  be  one  of the  pro- 
tected  groups.325   The conditions inflicted  “must be calculated to 
bring  about  the  physical  destruction of the  targeted group in 
whole or in part  and  must be inflicted  on it deliberately.”326    As 
mentioned above,  the  crime  covers  methods of destruction by 
which  the  perpetrator does  not  immediately kill group  mem- 
bers,  but  which, ultimately,  seek their  physical destruction.327 
Acts covered  by this crime  “include,  but  are  not  limited  to 
. . . subjecting the  group to a subsistence diet,  systematic expul- 
sion  from  homes  and  denial  of the  right  to  medical  services;” 
“[a]lso included is the creation of circumstances that would lead 
to  a slow death, such  as lack of proper housing, clothing and 
hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.”328   The Rome 
Statute’s  Elements  of Crimes  explains  that  the  crime  “may in- 
clude,  but  is not  necessarily  restricted to, deliberate deprivation 
of resources indispensable for survival, such  as food  or medical 
services, or systematic expulsion from  homes.”329 
For this underlying crime,  it is not  required to prove  physi- 
cal destruction in whole or in part  of the  targeted group.330   In 
the  Brd–janin case, an ICTY Trial Chamber found that  the  condi- 
tions  at various  camps  and  detention facilities “were calculated 
to  bring  about  physical  destruction [of]  Bosnian  Muslim  and 
Bosnian  Croat  detainees and  . . . were inflicted  deliberately.”331 
 
325.  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 692 (Sept.  1, 2004) 
(“The  group upon which  these  conditions are  inflicted  must  be  a  protected group 
under the  terms  of the  Genocide Convention.”). 
326.  Id. 
327.  Prosecutor v. Stakic´,  Case No.  IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 518 (July 31, 2003) 
(“The  Trial Chamber in Akayesu held  that  the expression [calculated to bring  about  its 
physical destruction] ‘should  be construed as the  methods of destruction by which the 
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, 
seek their  physical destruction.’ ”). 
328.  Brdd–anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691; see also Stakic´ ,  Case No. IT-97- 
24-T, Judgment, ¶ 517. 
329.  Rome  Statute  of the  International Criminal  Court,  supra note  40, art.  6(c) 
(elements of genocide include “deliberately inflicting  conditions of life calculated to 
bring  about  its physical destruction in whole or in part”). 
330.  See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691 (“ ‘Deliberately  inflicting 
on  the  group conditions of life calculated to  bring  about  its physical  destruction in 
whole or in part’  under sub-paragraph (c)  does  not  require proof  of the  physical de- 
struction in whole or in part  of the  targeted group.”); see also Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24- 
T, Judgment, ¶ 517 (similar). 
331.  Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 909; see id. ¶¶ 909-62 (discussing 
the  Manjaca camp,  the  Mlavke football  stadium,  the  Bosanski Novi fire station,  the  Ko- 
tor  Varos prison,  the  Omarska  camp,  the  Keraterm camp,  the  Trnopolje camp,  the 
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Here,  there is a large  amount of factual  information show- 
ing that  the  crime  of deliberately inflicting  on the  group condi- 
tions of life calculated to bring  about  its physical destruction in 
whole or in part  has been  committed: 
• “Scorched-earth tactics:” As mentioned above,  both  Human 
Rights  Watch  and  the  U.S.  Congress  have  categorized the 
joint attacks by the Sudanese armed  forces and Janjaweed mi- 
litias as “scorched-earth tactics.”332   Virtually nothing remains 
of the villages attacked—items essential for survival are sys- 
tematically  destroyed.333 
• Janjaweed  burned villages, looted and  stole cattle: As part  of 
these  “scorched-earth tactics,  there are  countless  eye-witness 
accounts  of  Janjaweed   burning villages,334 looting,335   and 
 
Sloga shoe factory, the Betonirka factory garages, the Pribinic  camp, and the Territorial 
defense building in Teslic municipality). 
332.  See  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 7; see  also Comprehensive Peace  in 
Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(8),  50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006). 
333.  DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 2  Similarly: 
Human Rights Watch research in Darfur  in March  and  April 2004 confirmed 
reports from  refugees  in Chad  and  other sources  that  Sudanese government 
forces and  Janjaweed  have systematically attacked  and  destroyed villages, food 
stocks,  water  sources  and  other items  essential  for  the  survival of  Fur  and 
Masalit villagers in large  parts  of West Darfur. 
Id. at 26. 
334.  Id.  at  9 (on  August  30, 2003,  soldiers  and  Janjaweed  attacked  and  burned 
Mororo); id. at 10 (Mororo was later burned a second  time);  id. (eye-witness to attack in 
the  Murnei  area:  “They burned everything,  looted  everything.”); id. (Murnei was later 
burned a second  time);  id. at 11 (“In November 2003, Janjaweed  attacked  at least four 
villages close to Mango  - Angar, Bayda, Nyorongta and  Shushta  – and  remained in the 
villages after  burning them.”); id.  (“The  villages burned included Gororg,   Dureysa, 
Tirja,  Maliam,  Mororo,  Gorra  and  Korkojok,”  said thirty-seven-year-old  Ahmad,  a for- 
mer  Urum  resident.); id. at 13 (village in the  Bareh  area,  east of Geneina burned); id. 
at 14 (Habila Canare, east of El Geneina burned); id. at 15 (Kondoli, in the  Misterei 
area  burned); id. at 17 (as to Kenyu, near  Fobranga:  “Everything  was burned”; “[o]n 
the  same  day  they  burned  Buranga”); id.  (thirty   villages  of  Sildi  were  looted   and 
burned); id. at 18 (in  Tunfuka, south  of Murnei,  they  burned the  village);  id. at 19 
(Janjaweed burned Tullus);  id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the army burned houses);  id. at 22 (a 
large  area  of  Wadi  Salih  was burned: “Dozens  of  villages around Deleig  have  been 
burned by the  government”); id. at 23 (both Bindisi and  Kudung  were partly  burned 
and destroyed); id. at 25 (only one hut  in Korkoria  was unburned); id. at 26 (“[i]n one 
of the areas systematically surveyed by Human Rights Watch in April [2004],” all villages 
were partially  or totally burned). 
335.  Id. at 10 (eye-witness to attack  in the  Murnei  area;  “They . . . looted  every- 
thing.”); id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the army stole some grain and burned the rest); id. at 23 
(as to both  Bindisi and Kudung,  the market  and shops were totally looted); see id. at 26 
(“Sudanese government  forces  and  Janjaweed  have  systematically  attacked   and  de- 
stroyed  villages, food  stocks, water sources  and  other items essential  for the  survival of 
Fur and Masalit villagers in large parts of West Darfur.”);  id. (in one of the areas system- 
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stealing  cattle.”336   The  looting,  for  example, was clearly or- 
ganized  and  premeditated.  Army troops  and  Janjaweed  have 
been  told  they  could  keep  their  looted  goods  if they  “fight 
well.”337    A former   government soldier  clarified  the  policy: 
“You keep  what you have taken.   It applies  to the officers too. 
One   exception:   the   animals.    The   animals   are   given  to 
Janjaweed  nomads who keep  them.   Then  they are  sold.”338 
• Food stocks were systematically destroyed:  As  part   of   the 
“scorched–earth tactics,” food stocks have been  systematically 
destroyed.339 
• Putting  dead bodies down wells to contaminate water supply: 
There have been  accounts of Janjaweed  putting dead  bodies 
down  wells in  Darfur   in  order to  contaminate water  sup- 
plies.340 
• Destroying mosques and Korans: As discussed  above,341 there 
are  accounts of  Government and  Janjaweed  forces  having 
burned at least sixty-five mosques  in Dar Masalit, killed  peo- 
ple in mosques  as well as imams, and defecated on Korans.342 
• Denial of access to medical treatment: As discussed  above, wit- 
nesses have stated  that  severely ill or wounded villagers were 
 
atically surveyed  by Human Rights Watch  in April [2004],  “[f]ood storage  containers 
and other items necessary for the storage  and preparation of food were all destroyed”). 
336.  Id.  at  9 (on  August  30, 2003,  soldiers  and  Janjaweed  attacked  and  burned 
Mororo,  stealing  cattle);  id. at 11 (in  one  village in the  Mango  cluster,  Mango  Buratta, 
soldiers and Janjaweed stole all the cattle in the village); id. at 12 (eyewitnesses reported 
in November 2003, that  Janjaweed  came to Urum  and took 3,000 head  of cattle);  id. at 
18 (in Tunfuka, south of Murnei,  they rounded up the cattle);  id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the 
army stole 1,000 cattle);  see id. at 31 (discussing the lucrative business of cattle rustling); 
see also ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 6 (estimating in total the  theft  of mil- 
lions of livestock). 
337.  ENTRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 20 (quoting Human Rights Watch 
interview with former  African Union  military observer  in the  Netherlands on Sept. 15, 
2005). 
338.  Id. at 20 (quoting Human Rights Watch interview with government soldier  in 
SLA custody  in North Darfur  on  July 14, 2005). 
339.  See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 26 (“Sudanese government forces and 
Janjaweed have systematically attacked  and destroyed villages, food stocks, water sources 
and  other items  essential  for the  survival of Fur and  Masalit villagers in large  parts  of 
West Darfur.”);  id. (in one of the areas systematically surveyed by Human Rights Watch 
in April [2004],  “[f]ood storage  containers and  other items  necessary  for the  storage 
and  preparation of food  were all destroyed”). 
340.  Interview  with  Eric  Reeves,  supra  note   6.   Congress   has  referred  to  the 
“poisoning of . . . wells.” Comprehensive Peace  in Sudan  Act of 2004 § 3(9),  50 U.S.C. 
§ 1701 (2006). 
341.  See supra Part  II.A.2. 
342.  See DARFUR  DESTROYED, supra note  8, at 28. 
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denied access to hospitals  and  health care.343 
• Others are resettled into the areas formerly occupied by the African 
tribes: The  return of  those  displaced has  largely  been  pre- 
vented  by resettlement of Janjaweed  and  other Arab  ethnic 
groups  in areas  previously populated by Masalit and  Fur.344 
• Denial of humanitarian  assistance: As described above,  the 
Government of Sudan  has denied humanitarian assistance  to 
those  displaced. 
• Rape and other forms of sexual violence: As discussed  above, 
large  numbers of rapes  and  other forms  of sexual  violence 
have occurred.345 
 
Here,  it certainly  appears that  these  conditions were both 
(a)  calculated to  bring  about   the  physical  destruction of  the 
targeted groups  in  whole  or  in  part,  and  (b)  inflicted  deliber- 
ately.  As to the acts that have been  deemed to be covered  by this 
crime,  case law has included, for instance:   subjecting the  group 
to a subsistence diet; systematic expulsion from homes;  denial  of 
the  right  to medical  services; lack of proper housing and  cloth- 
ing346—all crimes  present here.   Thus,  it is quite  clear  that  this 
underlying crime  has been  committed. 
Accordingly,  factual  information gathered as to the  crimes 
committed in Darfur  clearly shows the dolus specialis of genocide: 
(1)  intent to destroy; (2)  in whole or in part; (3)  the Fur, Masalit 
and Zaghawa ethnic  groups;  (4)  as such.  Arguments that the 
extensive displacement negates  “intent  to destroy,” or that  other 
motives were at issue than  destruction, are  rebuttable or legally 
incorrect. The facts also clearly show that  at least three of geno- 
cide’s  underlying  crimes   have  been   committed  (any  one   of 
which  would  suffice for a legal case):   killing,  serious  bodily or 
mental  harm,  and  deliberately inflicting  conditions of life calcu- 
 
343.  Id. at 35. 
344.  Id. at 40.  As explained by Human Rights Watch: 
[T]he land  on  which displaced persons  and  refugees  once  lived has become 
free for the taking,  open  to use and occupation by the ethnic  groups  compris- 
ing  the  Janjaweed,  by new  arrivals  fleeing  a linked  conflict  in  neighboring 
Chad,  and by others.   Land occupation serves to consolidate the ethnic  cleans- 
ing campaign, and  greatly threatens the  prospects for long-term peace  in the 
region. 
CHAOS BY  DESIGN, supra note  2, at 22. 
345.  See infra Part  II.A.2.f. 
346.  Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691 (Sept.  1, 2004); 
see  Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 517 (July 31, 2003). 
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lated  to destroy  the  group in whole or in part.   Thus,  while this 
Article does not take the additional step of examining individual 
criminal  responsibility—as a criminal  case would be required to—
the  law and facts strongly indicate that  genocide has indeed 
occurred.347 
 
III.  THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT IN ITS PROSECUTION EFFORTS 
 
Even  if the  crimes  in  Darfur  are  genocide, however,  that 
does not  necessarily mean  they should  be prosecuted as such in 
the current situation. Ideally, of course,  they would be.  Yet, it is 
one  thing  to acknowledge something as genocide, and  another 
to bring  a prosecution against  an individual—proving that  indi- 
vidual’s genocidal intent beyond  a reasonable doubt.  It is fur- 
thermore, a much  more  difficult step to do so where the investi- 
gation   is  being   impeded by  the  Government of  the  country 
who’s cooperation the Prosecutor would need  in order to obtain 
documentary evidence  and  investigate  on  the  ground.  Because 
of the  difficulties  in the  instant  situation, this Article urges  the 
ICC Prosecutor to consider charging the crime  of genocide, but 
does  not  argue  emphatically that  he  need  do so. 
Under the  current circumstances, even if the  ICC does not 
charge  the  crime  of genocide, it will need  strong  support from 
the  international community in  order to  succeed  in  any of its 
Darfur  prosecutions. As noted above, the ICC has already issued 
arrest  warrants  for two individuals  charged with war crimes  and 
crimes against humanity committed in Darfur—Ahmad Muham- 
mad  Harun, former  Minister  of State  for  the  Interior and  cur- 
rent  Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Muham- 
mad  Ali Abd Al Rahman (known  as Ali Kushayb),  a Janjaweed 
militia leader.348   The Government of Sudan  opposes  ICC prose- 
cutions  and  has  refused  to  execute the  warrants.349    Thus,  the 
 
347.  While  this  approach is somewhat  artificial,  it follows that  of the  ICTY and 
ICTR which “have undertaken a threshold inquiry  of whether genocide writ large  oc- 
curred in the  region  in which the  individual  was operating.  Then,  the  tribunals con- 
sider whether the particular defendant possessed genocidal intent.”   Van Schaack, supra 
note  7, at n.110. 
348.  See Sixth Report, supra note  13, ¶ 2. 
349.  For  example, rather than  executing the  ICC’s warrant  for  Harun, Sudan’s 
president Omar  Bashir has refused  to turn  him over and instead  put him on a commit- 
tee overseeing deployment of the new peacekeeping mission. See generally Delay, Obstruc- 
tion and Darfur, supra note  35.  As mentioned above, the Government of Sudan  has also 
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ICC’s Darfur  investigation is quite  different, for example, than 
its investigations  regarding crimes in the Democratic Republic  of 
Congo,  Uganda and  the  Central  African Republic.   All three of 
those  countries had  joined  the  Rome Statute,  and  their  Govern- 
ments  invited  the  ICC Prosecutor to open  investigations.350    Su- 
dan,  by contrast, has not  joined  the  Rome Statute;  the  situation 
was referred to the ICC not by the Sudan,  but by the U.N. Secur- 
ity Council;351 and the Government of Sudan  is openly hostile to 
the ICC’s work.  Thus, if there are to be any successful ICC pros- 
ecutions   of the  crimes  in  Darfur—which there  most  emphati- 
cally should be—a  great  deal  of international pressure must  be 
used  to ensure that  the  Government of Sudan  cooperates  with 
the  ICC  (including in  executing arrest  warrants), as it  is cur- 
rently  obligated to do by Security Council  resolution.352 
Serious attention should  also be paid to the number of indi- 
viduals being prosecuted. To date, the ICC has issued two public 
arrest  warrants  (although perhaps more  are under seal).   Given 
the  magnitude of the  crimes  committed, two prosecutions (or 
even  a few more),353  would  hardly  suffice as “doing  justice.”354 
 
 
recently  given a government post to Janjaweed  leader  Musa Hilal, who is implicated in 
various crimes.   See Sudan Gives Advisor Role to Militia Leader, supra note  136. 
350.  See  Press Release,  ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral  of the  Situation in  the 
Democratic Republic  of Congo (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.iss-cpt.int/press- 
release_details&id=19&1=en.html; Press Release, ICC President of Uganda Refers Situa- 
tion Concerning the Lord’s Resistance  Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2005), http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&1=en.html; Press Release,  ICC, Prosecutor 
Receives Referral  Concerning Central  African Republic  (Jan.  7, 2005), http://www.icc- 
cpt.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&1=en.html. 
351.  S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  A day after ICC Pros- 
ecutor  Luis Moreno Ocampo on  June  6, 2005 announced that  the  ICC would investi- 
gate the crimes in Darfur,  Sudan  announced the establishment of the Special National 
Criminal  Court  for  Darfur.  See  ENTRENCHING   IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at 68-69.  The 
timing  of the  announcement suggests there will be an attempt by Sudan  to avoid the 
ICC’s jurisdiction by raising a challenge under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. See Rome 
Statute  of the  International Criminal  Court,  supra note  40, art. 17. 
352.  See  S.C. Res. 1593,  ¶ 2, U.N.  Doc  S/RES/1593 (Mar.  31, 2005)  (the  U.N. 
Security Council  decided “that  the  Government of Sudan  and  all other parties  to the 
conflict in Darfur,  shall cooperate fully with and provide  any necessary assistance”) (em- 
phasis added). 
353.  The International Commission of Inquiry compiled a list of fifty-one names of 
individuals  who should  be investigated  for crimes  in Darfur.  See Commission  of Inquiry, 
supra note  7,  ¶ 645.   Human Rights  Watch  has  named at  least  twenty-two.  See  EN- 
TRENCHING  IMPUNITY, supra note  10, at Annex  1 (“Partial  list of individuals  who should 
be investigated  by the  ICC,” naming seven Sudanese national officials, including Presi- 
dent   Bashir;  five current or  former   regional officials;  four  Sudanese military  com- 
manders and  six Janjaweed  militia  leaders). 
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Furthermore, under  the   current  regime   in  Sudan,   one   can 
hardly   rely   upon  Sudanese  courts   to   prosecute  additional 
cases.355 
The  way forward  requires: (a)  the  Government of  Sudan 
and  Janjaweed  militias  to  end  all attacks;  (b)  immediate  secu- 
rity needs  being  met  by successful deployment of the  combined 
African Union  and U.N. “hybrid” peacekeeping force 
(“UNAMID”);356  (c)  eventually,  a political  solution  for the  peo- 
ple of Darfur;  (d)  containment of the  violence  in Chad  and  the 
Central  African Republic;  (e)  strong  support for the  ICC’s Dar- 
fur prosecution; and  (f)  eventually,  additional justice efforts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The  facts clearly suggest that  the  crimes  committed in Dar- 
fur are  genocide.  All of the  elements of the  dolus specialis (spe- 
cial mental  state)  of genocide are  present, and  at least three of 
genocide’s underlying crimes have clearly been  committed. The 
United States was correct when it determined the situation to be 
genocide.357   It is disappointing that international actors, such as 
the  U.N. and/or NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have not 
taken  that  step.   Not that  it should matter what  mass  killing  is 
called before  it is stopped; yet, it might  have facilitated  the situa- 
tion had the decision  been  made  earlier  to identify the crimes as 
genocide.  Of course,  the  more  urgent priority  is stopping the 
crimes—which has still not  been  achieved—due in large part  to 
China’s  shameful  threat over the  last several years to veto force- 
ful U.N. deployment of troops  in Darfur,358  and  Sudanese stall- 
ing of the  agreement to consensual deployment of U.N. troops. 
 
354.  As is often quoted: it is “of fundamental importance that justice should not only 
be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly  be seen to be done.” King v. Sussex Justices, Ex 
parte  McCarthy  [1924]  1 KB 256, [1923]  All ER 233 (emphasis added). 
355.  See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, National Courts Have Done Nothing 
in Darfur:   ICC Prosecution Needed; Government Must Hand Over Suspects (June  11, 
2007), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/11/sudan16110.htm; HUMAN 
RIGHTS  WATCH, LACK   OF CONVICTION:  THE SPECIAL  CRIMINAL COURT ON  THE  EVENTS IN 
DARFUR  (2006)  (the  briefing  paper examines the  operations of the  court,  which  was 
purportedly established by the  Sudanese government to address  the  crimes in Darfur). 
356.  The  Security Council  has authorized a January 1, 2008 deployment of 26,000 
peacekeepers to replace  the 7000 African Union  peacekeepers (“AMIS”) that have been 
in Sudan.  See Delay, Obstruction  and Darfur, supra note  35. 
357.  See supra note  5 and  accompanying text. 
358.  “Russia and  China  have  often  supported the  Sudanese government [at  the 
Security  Council] because  of ideological commitments (non-interference  in  internal 
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The  world  must  start  to  act  forcefully  in  the  face of genocide, 
and  take  seriously the  “responsibility  to protect.”  How can one 
keep   saying  “never   again,”   after   the   Holocaust  occurs,   and 
Rwanda’s genocide occurs  and Darfur’s  genocide occurs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
affairs of member states)  and  both  have economic interests  in Sudan.”  HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note  3. 
